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From And Within Eastern Europe
PIOTR KORCELLI
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A revised version of the paper presented at the Workshop on East European Migrations, 
European Culture Research Centre, European University Institute, Florence, 22 November
1991.
Introduction
During the recent years a concern has been growing in Western Europe, and in 
particular in the EC countries, over the massive influx of foreign migrants. 
This concern is to some degree a reaction to the observed increase in the num­
ber of immigrants and asylum-seekers during the 1980s. However, it reflects 
primarily the existence of pressures that are building-up and that may not be 
easily brought under control.
First of all, demographic disparities between the North and the South have 
reached ever greater proportions. As reports of the 9th IOM Seminar on 
Migration indicate, in order to absorb the new entrants onto their labour mar­
kets, the less developed countries will have to create in the next twenty years, a 
number of new jobs greater than the total present stock in the developed coun­
tries (International Organization for Migration, 1990). This is far above any 
realistic target, to say the least. The continuing rapid population growth in the 
South coincides with the stagnation, and a projected contraction of population 
numbers throughout Western Europe, and, in spite of local unemployment and 
low female labour participation rates, with a constantly growing demand for 
skilled labour in the major industrial countries. This occurs at the time of in­
creasing income and welfare disparities between the North and the South, as 
well as rapid improvements in communication, that speed-up the rise of human 
aspirations and expectations on the global scale.
Parallel to these developments, the disintegration of the Soviet Block, and then 
of the Soviet Union itself, has opened the question of massive international 
East-West migration. A liberalization, followed by the elimination of exit re­




























































































Prospects fo r  International Migration from  and within Eastern Europe
able migration wave in the late 1980s. The implementation of the "passport for 
everybody" policy in Russia, and perhaps other post-Soviet republics, as 
foreseen for 1993, will provide a new strong stimulus to emigrate, in particu­
lar, when ethnic tension, unemployment, and a general decrease in living stan­
dards evolve in accordance with a pessimist scenario.
Finally, the progress in the integration of Western Europe, now in full swing, 
brings some anxiety to the question of immigration. Along with the elimination 
of border controls within the EC, Western Europe may be perceived an easy 
target for undocumented, illegal migration. Also, the most permissive policies, 
such as the German asylum law, may soon become de facto European standards 
for the admission of aliens.
The present paper focuses on the role of selected migration factors, and the re­
sulting emigration propensities that are likely to prevail during the 1990s in 
Eastern Europe and in the countries of the former Soviet Union. The IOM re­
port quotes estimates of future emigration from the former USSR ranging 
from 2.5 to 50 million (International Organization on Migration, 1990, p.4). 
Such an extremely wide spectrum of estimates has its source in the high degree 
of uncertainty concerning future political and economic change, but it also ex­
poses the scarcity of studies on patterns and determinants of international East- 
West migration.
Factors and correlates of International migration
Migration across the Iron Curtain was a perennial feature of the post-Second 
World War order in Europe. Its magnitude fluctuated considerably over time, 
following the rhythm of political change. The flow of East Germans via West 
Berlin to West Germany since the early 1950s, of Hungarians into Austria af­
ter 1956, and of Czeches and Slovaks after 1968, provided classical illustra­
tions of the problem. The emigration from Poland during the 1980s has been 
accounted for more recently (Korcelli, 1991). Few data are available concern­
ing the former Soviet Union. A revealing recent report by Smirnov (1990) es­
timates the total number of emigrants at 1.2 million between 1946-1990, in­
cluding 0.7 million in the last five years.
All these movements (except for migration from Poland in the late 1980s) took 
place under more or less stringent restrictions on exit, and, typically, when 
temporary openings existed in the international East-West borders. Therefore, 
data concerning these flows represent a very limited basis for any projections 
of future migration flows. When attempting to make such projections it is nec­





























































































For the purpose of this discussion one can identify four rules governing spatial 
mobility of the population. The first rule concerns the demographic pressure 
upon land and other local resources and refers to such indicators as the rate of 
population growth and its age composition. In the age category of 20-29 years, 
the propensity to migrate is normally several times higher than the mean mi­
gration rate. Hence, a large cohort, once it enters the early adulthood, tends to 
generate a wave of migration, internal (rural-urban and interregional), inter­
national, or both.
The second rule ascribes the directions and volume of population movements 
to the disparities in incomes and living standards between regions, as well as 
among nations. The third rule assumes a degree of complementarity to exist 
between internal and international migrations. It namely claims that the scale 
of emigration is inversely related to the absorptive capacity of urban labour 
markets in a given country.
Finally, the fourth rule which seems to account for a very substantial part of 
East-West migration over the past several decades, refers to political and eth­
nic aspects of population mobility over space. Boundary shifts, boundary 
openings, and political and social unrest, which are often interrelated phenom­
ena, invariably result in waves of human migration, frequently involuntary, 
and involving ethnic minorities in the first place.
These four rules fall naturally short of summarizing the wide spectrum of mi­
gration hypotheses (see: Clark, 1987, for a concise overview) but they allow us 
to speculate about future East-West migration using a few alternative, and at 
least partially complementary approaches. Demographic determinants of mi­
gration have mainly been exposed in the literature on interrelations between 
population and economic development (see, for example: United Nations, 
1981). Rogers and Castro (1981) quantified the interdependence between mi­
gration and age of the population. Income differentials have traditionally been 
at the core of economic migration models, both of the macro (see, for exam­
ple: Greenwood, 1978) and micro (see: Todaro, 1976) type.
The interdependence between internal and international migration has never 
been studies in a greater detail, although some authors (Jenkins, 1977; 
Korcelli, 1991a) have pointed out its potential role in explaining observed mi­
gration patterns. At last, what is here considered as political and ethnic factors 
of international migration can partly be subsumed under the so-called primary 
even hypothesis (Choguill, 1983) which refers to sudden adverse changes, such 




























































































Prospects fo r  International Migration from  and within Eastern Europe
Eastern Europe: no longer one region
With these four rules, or hypotheses at hand, let us now briefly examine the 
incentives to emigrate, that are likely to exist in the major sending countries of 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union throughout the 1990s.
The first observation due to be made is that the East can no longer be treated 
as one of the geopolitical regions of the world. Within Eastern Europe proper, 
the three countries of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary have emerged as a 
separate subregion (called sometimes the Vyshegrad Triangle), usually defined 
as East-Central Europe. Their specific position vis-a-vis the rest of Eastern 
Europe is reflected in the membership in the Council of Europe as well as 
their status of associates regarding the European Community. As it will be 
shown later, this division can also be traced with respect to the patterns of in­
ternational migration.
The remaining countries of Eastern Europe (other than the post-Soviet states), 
are by no means a homogeneous group, although they are generally character­
ized by a much earlier, compared with the countries of East-Central Europe, 
phase of transition towards market economy.
Within the territory of the former Soviet Union one can distinguish (as of 
early 1992) at least four geopolitical groupings: (a) the Baltic States, deter­
mined to join East- Central and Western Europe as quickly as possible, (b) 
Georgia and Armenia with their historical and cultural links to the 
Mediterranean basin, (c) the predominantly Slavic countries of Russia, 
Bielorussia and the Ukraine, and, (d) the post-Soviet Central Asia, now drift­
ing towards the Islamic World.
Out of all countries of Eastern Europe, Poland contributed the largest number 
of emigrants during the 1980s. The outflow of the population was particularly 
large during 1980- 1981 and 1987-1989, when more than a half of the esti­
mated 800 thousand people emigrated to the West. The Federal Republic of 
Germany accounted for well over 50 percent of all emigrants, the United 
States for about 20 percent, and Canada for about 12 percent. The pace of 
emigration has slowed down notably since 1990, and one can forecast its vol­
ume in the current decade to be no more than one-half of what it was during 
the 1980s (see: Korcelli, 1991). Recent sociological studies suggest a gradual 
turn of attitudes among the Polish population, favouring temporary moves 
abroad over permanent migration. Factors that will continue to stimulate out­
migration (including temporary leaves) are mainly of demographic nature. 





























































































of young people entering the labour market will be particularly large (over 2 
million) during the 1990s.
One should not expect a major emigration wave to originate in Hungary or 
Czechoslovakia during the present decade, or thereafter. The two countries, 
with their ageing populations and relatively vital economies, may suffer from a 
brain drain which they have already experienced in the past. However, in 
terms of the numbers of potential emigrants their contribution will probably 
be very small when compared to that of other East European countries.
Much bigger sources of potential international migration are to be found in 
South-Eastern Europe, in Romania and other post-communist states of the 
Balkan, countries which are still to undergo major political and economic 
transformations en route to democracy and market economy. The exodus of 
Albanians in 1991 provides a drastic example of what can still happen in the 
region. The war in Yugoslavia has already resulted in large displacements of 
the population. Nevertheless, such crisis developments are unlikely to occur 
throughout the whole region at one time. The case of Albania is rather 
marginal in the sense of its rapid demographic growth combined with back­
wardness and political and cultural isolation. A considerable proportion of the 
undoubtedly large migration to be expected in South-Eastern Europe during 
the 1990s will be contained within the region. These population transfers may 
mainly involve members of ethnic minorities migrating to their external 
homelands. Some of the migratory flows will definitely spill over the regions 
boundaries, particularly to Hungary, Italy, Germany and Austria.
The volume of this migration would be extremely difficult to predict; basi­
cally, it should not exceed tens of thousand on the annual basis. Its timing will 
be probably very irregular, as such population movements are mainly respon­
sive to political and ethnic factors, i.e. the primary events.
Emigration from the post-Soviet States
While referring to the countries of the former Soviet Union one should begin 
with a caveat concerning our ability to perceive the nature of migration pat­
terns in the so-called Soviet Central Asia. One way to proceed is to assume that 
the region would increasingly exhibit the social and political features prevail­
ing in the Middle East. In this case the international migration originating in 
the region could be treated within the framework of South-North migration.
Alternatively, one can claim that previous and still dominant political and eco­




























































































Prospects fo r  International Migration from  and within Eastern Europe
orbit of East-West population movements. The latter hypothesis would imply a 
rather explosive combination of high emigration propensities characteristic of 
post-communist societies, with the huge demographic momentum typical of 
many Third World countries.
For the sake of the present discussion we shall assume the former situation to 
prevail and hence focus on possible migration from Russia and the other 
European parts of the former Soviet Union. The sheer size of the population 
involved, and the complexity of problems ahead leave little doubt as to the 
dominant role of the region in the East-West migration during the 1990s. How 
can its volume be estimated with the help of the four hypotheses that were out­
lined earlier in this paper?
The main component of population growth in the former Soviet Union was a 
very high population fertility in the Asian (including the Transcaucasian) re­
publics. This, in fact, was considered an issue by many Soviet demographers. 
Russia as well as other republics in the European part of the Union were in a 
fairly advanced stage of demographic transition already during the 1970s, only 
a decade or so behind some countries of Western Europe. This situation is not 
likely to change to any significant degree during the 1990s, although the popu­
lation number in the generally mobile category of 20- 29 years will increase 
relative to its present size. Nevertheless, the role of demographic factors may 
be interpreted as one restraining rather than stimulating the tendency towards 
population emigration from Russia and the other post-Soviet states in the 
European part.
Advanced demographic ageing characterises the urban, as well as the rural 
population in the region. Many of its parts, including some among the most 
fertile agricultural lands, have for decades experienced a serious depletion of 
the rural population, in fact, a far-reaching rural depopulation. This has been 
the outcome of state policies (based on ideology) favouring extensive urban­
ization and industrialization with its inefficient use of manpower. The low 
level of incomes and a poor access to services in the rural areas have greatly 
contributed to rural-urban migration.
These trends, however, may be discontinued in the near future. If privatisation 
of farmland becomes a reality, the labour demand in agriculture will increase 
considerably, at least in a short and mid-term. At the same time, many cities 
and towns, with their declining, state-owned industries, will lose their attrac­
tiveness from the point of view of prospective migrants. The net result of these 
anticipated changes will probably consist in a serious decrease of internal 





























































































tion tends to be conducive to an increase in emigration propensity on the part 
of the urban population in particular.
Some segments of the post-Soviet urban labour markets seem to be especially 
vulnerable when confronted with the rules of market competition, including 
the foreign one, as well as with a large scale disarmament. The relevant occu­
pational categories include scientists and engineers employed in innumerable 
institutes and R & D centres, both in the civilian and the military sector. The 
case of nuclear experts, lured by some of the LDCs, has recently received a 
broad press coverage. A less widely known fact is that some 800 scientists and 
8000 engineers already came to the United States, among the total of 50 thou­
sand immigrants from the Soviet Union in 1980.
One refers here to a large and generally mobile category of workers, often 
equipped with universaly recognized skills and knowledge, and perhaps the one 
most fully aware of the existing disparities in living standards and income lev­
els at the international scale.
These, of course, are not the kinds of immigrants that decision makers in 
Western Europe are mainly concerned about. The potential high migration 
wave, it is believed, might occur as a result of possible calamities such as war 
and famine, and would involve people in a sort of random way, irrespective of 
their profession, age, or economic status. The likelihood of such "primary 
events" taking place seems however somewhat exaggerated. The main dividing 
lines in the post-Soviet societies are no longer the class conflicts that led to 
civil wars and revolutions in the past. The main divisions are now between 
various national and ethnic groups, as well as between different interest and 
power groups. Such divisions tend to generate violent conflicts, as their al­
ready have, but primarily on a local, perhaps a regional level. Consequently, 
the resulting migration of the population may also be largely confined to the 
local and regional scale.
This rule does not apply to those national and ethnic minorities whose home­
lands are external to the former Soviet Union. The freedom to leave, once 
granted, becomes in itself a major incentive to emigrate, as it has been the case 
of the Jewish minority (which has accounted for a large share of all emigrants 
so far) and to some extent the Greek minority. Any further deterioration of 
living conditions, any real or perceived danger will tend to increase rapidly the 
propensity to emigrate on the part of the populations involved. One should re­
fer here first of all, along with the Jewish, to the German, and subsequently the 
Polish minority groups, the size of which is estimated at about 2 million each. 
The utmost confusion surrounding the issue of the German population, now 




























































































Prospects fo r  International Migration from  and within Eastern Europe
gration to Germany in the near future. The series of "invitations” extended to 
this minority group to resettle into the Koenigsberg district, the middle Volga 
region, and then to the Ukraine (and the Crimea) expose the lack of stability 
and of predictability with regard to the national and ethnic questions in the 
post-Soviet states.
Poles, the other large minority, have been scattered throughout the whole 
territory of the former Soviet Union, but more than half of them live in the 
neighbouring Lithuania, Bielorussia, and the Ukraine. Once these former 
Soviet Republics gained sovereignty some tension and prejudice has re- 
emerged, mainly in Lithuania, where the local Polish population predominates 
in the area immediately adjacent to the capital of Vilnius (in Polish - Wilno). 
Such developments may lead to a selective at least migration of Lithunian Poles 
to Poland.
When group-specific migration propensities are plotted against measures of 
socio-economic status, such as income, the resulting function often assumes a 
U-shape (see: Urzua, 1981). This interdependence exposes the socio-economic 
mobility behaviour of the relatively successful, and the survival behaviour on 
the part of the poorer and less educated members of the society. This bimodal­
ity concept helps us to understand why, according to many authors, the newly 
arrived migrants tend predominantly to join the ranks of the urban unem­
ployed, while other sources indicate that they fare actually better than the av­
erage urban residents.
As it has been argued throughout this section, emigrants from the former 
Soviet Union are likely to represent primarily the first of the two types, their 
capital consisting of knowledge, national affinity to an external homeland, or, 
frequently, both. Those at the other end of the spectrum will most often chose, 
or have to stay, the situation which may not necessarily endanger their very 
survival. To put this in other words, one can expect emigration from the post- 
Soviet states to continue to be highly selective, involving professional - the 
universally mobile category; as well as members of major national minorities. 
In fact, these two categories tend to overlap to a certain extent.
We may also witness migration, mostly of a temporary character, of semi­
skilled persons seeking employment abroad, mostly in the informal sector of 
the economy, in construction and petty trade. However, the majority of the 
potentially mobile population groups in the former Soviet Union will try to 
make the best use of opportunities at home. These, after all, may not be far 
below of what was experienced in the past. If privatisation of collective and 
state farms gets a real start within the next few years, the observed downward 





























































































tions lead us to an estimation of the size of emigration from the former Soviet 
Union in the range of several hundred thousands a year, rather than the often 
mentioned several-million a year, during the 1990s.
To the post-Soviet states, such a selective migration can imply not so much a 
loss of the demographic potential, as a very considerable loss of talent, knowl­
edge, and enterpreneurship - a typical brain drain in fact. It can also lead to a 
greater national and ethnic homogeneity. On the other hand, as an effect of 
emigration the imminent urban unemployment together with the perennial 
housing shortage (aggravated along with the withdrawal of the Soviet army 
from Eastern Germany and Poland) may be somewhat relieved, at least on a 
temporary basis. The potential inflow of remittances should also be mentioned 
in this context.
International Migration within Eastern Europe and the Former 
Soviet Union
Despite of the polarization processes that have been going on within Eastern 
Europe, the countries of the former "Socialist Block" have basically retained 
the mutual visa-free travel arrangements. When combined with the liberaliza­
tion of passport policies and travel permits, this has led to a tremendous ex­
pansion of the volume of traffic across national borders.
Perhaps the largest-scale phenomenon of this kind is the inflow of population 
from the former Soviet Union to Poland. It has grown, in terms of the number 
of border crossings, from 1.7 million in 1988 to 4.3 million in 1990 and 7.6 
million in 1991. With the alleged travel purposes being mostly tourism and 
visiting family members, the large majority of newcomers carry on small scale 
trade. Every major city in Poland, and many smaller towns as well, feature 
semi- permanent "Russian markets" where goods such as tools, toys and glass­
ware, often hard to buy in the countries of origin, are offered at comparatively 
low prices. The earnings, exchanged for clothing or hard currencies, are 
shipped back across Poland's eastern border.
A big majority of such visits take a few or several days only. The movement is 
mainly of a circulation type, involving repeated trips by a relatively limited 
number of individuals. However, with numbers growing over time, a surplus 
of approximately 140 thousand entries over the number of departures, has ac­
cumulated since the beginning of 1991. It is estimated that about 70 thousand 
people from the post- Soviet states have taken jobs in the informal sector, 
mostly in construction and agriculture. Hence, although on a rather small scale, 




























































































Prospects fo r  International Migration from  and within Eastern Europe
ployment is accompanied by immigration, with immigrants establishing 
themselves in those segments of the labour markets where they face a rather 
small competition on the part of the local residents.
Illegal crossing to Western Europe has not been the purpose of the inflow to 
Poland of people from the former Soviet Union. This is a "speciality" of 
Romanian subjects (many of whom are Roma), who accounted for 8676 out of 
the total of 11786 aborted attempts to cross the Polish western border. Citizens 
of the post-Soviet states do, however, get involved in other forms of criminal 
activity while in Poland.
Immigration per se from the former Soviet Union has so far been small. Some 
12 thousand Soviet citizens have received permanent residence status (a major­
ity of those who applied) by September 1991 (Bematowicz, 1991) and only a 
handful have claimed asylum rights in Poland. The number of immigrants, 
mostly Poles or of Polish origin, is expected to grow in the near future. 
Policies are considered granting a special resettled status to former Polish 
subjects and their descendants.
Population movement from the post-Soviet states to Poland represents just one 
aspect of the extremely complicated, observed as well as potential migration 
flows in Eastern Europe. The immigration of ethnic Hungarians from Romania 
to Hungary, of ethnic Turks from Bulgaria to Turkey, and the most recent 
refugee flows caused by the war in Yugoslavia mark some of the problems that 
are far from being resolved. In terms of volume and distances, however, these 
movements will certainly be overshadowed by future migration within the 
territory of the former Soviet Union.
The present-day population geography of the post-Soviet states reflects the 
long and violent history of colonization, forced resettlement and deportations, 
not to speak of the arbitrary boundary design between the former, Union and 
autonomous republics. The revival of the national consciousness which is now 
witnessed over this huge territory generates a number of claims and counter­
claims of which the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh is just a most tragic ex­
ample.
Each of the peripheral, former Soviet republics contains a considerable 
Russian population minority, its biggest absolute number (12 million) living in 
the Ukraine, and the highest share among the total population (over 40 per­
cent) in Kazakhstan. In turn, members of every nation and ethnic group from 
the former Soviet Union and beyond are to be found in Russia's large cities 
and in Siberia. One can hardly imagine a complete reshuffling of the popula­





























































































of territorial ethnic homogeneity. Nevertheless, even partial adjustments of this 
kind would generate massive population transfers. These, rather than emigra­
tion to Western Europe and North America are likely to be the largest migra­
tory movements involving the post-Soviet states during the next twenty years 
or so.
Implications for Western Europe
In a study carried out at the International Institute for Applied Systems 
Analysis in Laxenburg (Austria), Wolf et al. (1988) experimented with a range 
of assumptions that represented departures from observed recent demographic 
trends. In their alternative population development scenarios for Europe the 
authors incorporated several major "surprises" (one at a time), such as a new 
baby-boom around the year 2000, a rapid fall in fertility rates, a decrease in 
mortality owing to a "magic drug", a major AIDS epidemics, and a new wave 
of immigration - one million arrivals annually from 1995 to the year 2004. As 
it turned out, the short-lasting dramatic events such as a baby-boom or an 
immigration wave, do not lead to abrupt shifts in the path of population 
change, while moderate but steady changes in basic demographic parameters 
tend to generate very big differences among the alternative futures.
Hence, the immigration of up to several million people (which is our best 
guess) from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to Western Europe 
by the beginning of the next century, or even up to 13 million (as estimated by 
the Eurobarometer study), would have no dramatic implications for Western 
Europe's demographic development. These figures are actually smaller than 
the number of foreign migrants (estimated at 14 million; see: Mackensen, 
1991) living in the major immigration countries of Central and Northern 
Europe at the beginning of the 1980s.
One can assume that owing to the advanced ageing of the population and the 
relatively rapid pace of economic and political transformations in the East, the 
large-scale emigration to the West would be a temporary, rather than a persis­
tent phenomenon. While the peak of the emigration wave from East-Central 
Europe occured during the 1980s, the main phase of emigration from the post- 
Soviet states may take place during the mid- and late 1990s.
In case of a large fraction of potential emigrants from the former Soviet Union 
Western Europe will likely serve as an intermediate destination en route to 
North and Latin America, and the Middle East.
Although less important in demographic terms, the immigration in the size 




























































































Prospects for International Migration from  and within Eastern Europe
social, and political life in Western Europe. Since skilled labour and profes­
sionals account for a considerable share of all newcomers, the long- term eco­
nomic implications are likely to be highly positive.
Aside from permanent migration, the next years will certainly witness an in­
tensification of commuting and weakly travel across the former East-West 
boundaries. Trips for trading and shopping, which are now the dominant type 
of cross- boundary contacts, will be increasingly replaced by commuting to 
work, education, and trips for leisure purposes. During the 1980s the freedom 
to travel abroad combined with an arbitrary structure of domestic prices in 
Poland created a massive influx of Polish "trading tourists" to Germany and 
Austria. The more recent movement from the former Soviet Union to Poland 
is basically a replication of this phenomenon.
At the same time, the continuing (although much smaller than earlier) differ­
ences in prices of some consumer goods (such as food, cigarettes and clothing), 
have been generating a stream of weekly shoppers from Germany to Poland; 
their number ammounted to 9151 thousand in 1991. Owing to a gradual 
equalization of prices and the liberalization of tariffs, such large-scale move­
ments may soon shrink considerably, or rather yield to more stable, functional 
relations across the border. In this context two regions in Central Europe de­
serve a special attention.
One of these is the Vienna-Bratislava area. The Slovak capital city of 400 thou­
sand inhabitants will probably be quickly drawn into the sphere of influence of 
its four times bigger neighbour situated only 60 kms up the Danube river (the 
distance from Bratislava's major residential suburb of Petrzalka to Schwechat, 
the Vienna international airport, is 44 kms, ten times shorter than to the 
Prague airport). The daily flow of commuters from Bratislava to Vienna, al­
ready noticeable, is likely to grow rapidly in the near future, with more and 
more people willing to take advantage of coupling the higher wages on the 
Vienna labour market, with the considerably lower housing costs in the resi­
dential districts of Bratislava.
Another region of potential intense interactions across the border is one focus­
ing on Berlin. The redevelopment of the city in anticipation of the transfer of 
capital functions from Bonn will certainly exert a great influence upon the 
whole area situated along the lower Oder river. Specific future development 
plans include an expansion of the seaport of Szczecin (Stettin), and of the city 
of Frankfurt a/Oder, where a new European University is expected to emerge, 






























































































The countries of East-Central Europe, i.e. Poland, Czechoslovakia and 
Hungary, will perform the role of a zone of transition between Eastern and 
Western Europe during the 1990s. This function may become strongly mani­
fested in all questions of international migration. While some migration from 
the region to Western Europe (Germany and Austria in particular) will con­
tinue, it may be increasingly compensated for by immigration into the region, 
originating in the rest of Eastern Europe, in particular the post-Soviet states 
and Romania. An increasing number of migrants, perhaps a sizeable share in­
deed, will enter East-Central Europe with an intention to move further on to 
the West. Therefore, migration and entry policies followed by Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary vis-a-vis third countries, should be of direct con­
cern and interest to the EC and other West European countries.
Conclusions
International East-West migration in Europe will be a conspicuous phe­
nomenon during the 1990s, although it will probably not attain the scale of a 
really massive population movement.
The main potential migration origins are to be found in the post-Soviet states, 
the emigration from which will probably be increasing until the later part of 
the decade. Conversely, in the case of the countries of East-Central Europe the 
peak phase of emigration seems to have already passed.
Migration from Eastern Europe to Western Europe and the Americas will 
continue to be selective, characterized by a high proportion of educated people 
and members of ethnic minorities among the migrants.
One can also anticipate a rapid increase in the magnitude of international mi­
gration among the countries of Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet 
Union. If the "high" forecasts (20 million or so migrants in Europe by the year 
2000) are to be fulfilled, they are likely to apply primarily to this category of 
population movements.
Some regions situated in the former peripheries between Eastern and Western 
Europe are certain to experience a rapid increase in the intensity of travel and 
traffic, as a consequence of the growing economic and human interaction 
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Political Dimensions Of Migration 
From And Among Soviet Successor States
Rogers Brubaker/ 
Department of Sociology 
University of California, Los Angeles
During the last few years, the gradual breakdown of the Soviet regime and the 
breakup of the Soviet state have intensified and transformed migration flows from 
and among the territories of the Soviet Union and its emerging successor states. 
Although the distinction between emigration and internal migration has been 
blurred by the progressive "internationalization" of formerly internal flows, I 
retain it here as an organizing principle, beginning with a discussion of out-mi­
gration, and then addressing "internal" flows.
9I. Emigration from the Soviet Union and its successor states has been much 
more limited than one might think from the alarmist rhetoric and sensationalist 
headlines of the last two years, warning of the imminent inundation of Western 
Europe. Not only is the size of the outflow still, at this writing, quite modest, but 
the ethnonational composition of the outflow, and the array of destinations, have 
been asymmetrical in the extreme. If the opportunity to emigrate has been among 
the more valuable, it has also been among the most unequally distributed, goods in 
the Soviet Union and its successor states. Emigration has been limited, in effect, to 
a small group of nationalities and destinations.
1 Dept, of Sociology, University of California, Los Angeles, 264 Haines Hall, 405 Hilgard 
Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90024-1551. This paper was commissioned for the Conference on 
International Migration and the Security and Stability of States, held at the Center for 
International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, December 5-6, 1991, and it will 
be published in book form in a volume resulting from that conference. I would like to thank 
Myron Weiner, Director of the Center for International Studies, for permission to use it in this 
Working Paper series. I would also like to thank Scott Bruckner for his research assistance and 
comments on early drafts.
Throughout the paper, emigration refers to migration from the Soviet Union and its successor 





























































































Political Dimensions o f  Migration from  and among Soviet Successor States
For the most part, emigration has consisted of movements of ethnic affinity to 
external national homelands. This means, above all, Germans and Jews, who com­
prised about three-fourths of all Soviet emigrants in 1990, while making up only 
1.2% of the Soviet population. Some 150,000 Germans (out of a total of 2 million 
Soviet Germans recorded in the 1989 census) and 200,000 Jews (out of 1.45 mil­
lion reported in the census) emigrated in 1990 (Chesnais 1991b, p. 6).
The exodus of Germans and Jews-similarly privileged, in an irony of history, by 
their immigration and citizenship rights in external homelands - continues, at this 
writing, at high levels.3 The German government, in an effort to stem the flow, 
and to preserve the centuries - old German presence in Russia,4 has been urging 
restoration of the autonomous Volga German Republic, which was abolished in 
1941 when Germans were deported en masse to Kazakhstan, Central Asia, and 
Siberia. Some Russian officials support the idea, hoping that a restored Volga 
Republic could retain German economic skills and energies and serve as a magnet 
for German investment from abroad.5 But the proposal has met strong resistance 
from current residents (mostly Russians) of what used to be the Volga Republic; 
at this writing, restoration seems unlikely.6 Even if the republic were restored, 
this would scarcely staunch the exodus. Not only is Germany's fabled prosperity a 
powerful lure; but the outflow tends to become self - sustaining : as more and 
more friends and family members leave, the attractions of remaining are dimin­
ished.
Nor is the exodus of Jews likely to abate, even without the lure of anything like 
Germany's fabled prosperity,7 and despite the quotas that now limit immigration
3 A German Interior Ministry official recently estimated ethnic German immigration from the 
Soviet Union at 13,000 per month (more than 150,000 per year); and representatives of the 
Soviet German community said that between 600,000 and 1 million Soviet Germans were in 
the process of applying to leave (Los Angeles Times, Nov. 9, 1991).
4 Germans first settled the lower Volga frontier region of the Russian state in large numbers in 
the 1760s, attracted by the lands, subsidies, religious autonomy, fiscal privileges, and service 
exemptions granted for this purpose by Catherine II (Koch 1977, pp. 6ff).
5 Los Angeles Times, Nov. 9, 1991.
6 Die Zeit 49 (November 29, 1991), p. 8 [German edition],
7 In a further irony of history, some Soviet Jews have been lured by Germany's fabled 
prosperity, seeking to emigrate to Germany rather than Israel, and placing the German 





























































































to America, the true promised land for most Soviet Jews. While emigration has 
declined from its dizzying peak of a year ago, it continues at historically high 
rates. Sporadically but frighteningly resurgent antisemitism-nourished by the 
anxieties, miseries, and dislocations of political and economic breakdown (or, op­
timistically, "transition") - will continue to feed the emigrant stream.
Besides Germans and Jews, several other nationalities may come to participate in 
migrations of ethnic affinity to external homelands. The major groups, their 
populations in the Soviet Union in 1989, and the fraction of the population listing 
the language of the group as its native language are as follows:8












These groups differ in pattern of settlement, degree of rootedness, and intensity 
and form of identification with their respective cultural nationalities and external 
homelands. And the homelands differ in economic and cultural attractiveness and
limited Jewish entry, citing-in yet a further ironic twist-its obligation to Israel to justify 
restricting the entry of Jews.
8 Population figures are from the 1989 census, as reported in Anderson and Silver 1989, pp. 
621-622. The language data for 1989 are not available to me at this writing, so I have calculated 
them from the 1979 census, as reported in Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie SSSR 
(1984), pp. 71-73.
9 Counted separately in the Soviet census from Moldavians. As part of an effort to incorporate 
Bessarabia (which became, for the most part, the Soviet republic of Moldavia) firmly into the 
Soviet Union, the regime insisted that Romanian and Moldavian were distinct nationalities 
founded on distinct languages (to support this linguistically groundless assertion, the regime 
imposed the Cyrillic alphabet on Moldavia; one of the early demands of the Moldavian national 
movement was for a return to the Roman alphabet). Almost all Soviet Romanians live in the 
Ukraine. There are also some 300,000 Moldavians living in the Ukraine, mostly in Cheronvitz 
and Odessa oblasts (Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie SSSR 1984, pp. 102, 104, 106), 
which were allocated some portions of the Bessarabian territories (and northern Bukovina) 




























































































Political Dimensions o f  Migration from  and among Soviet Successor States
in political readiness to grant them preferential immigration and citizenship status. 
Based on the fragmentary information available to me at this writing, a few 
sketchy observations can be made about these reservoirs of potential emigrants, 
focussing on Poles, the largest and most diverse group.10
Ethnic Poles are represented in substantial numbers (60,000 or more) in six suc­
cessor republics: Byelorussia (417,000), Lithuania (258,000), Ukraine (219,000), 
Russia (94,000), Latvia (60,000), and Kazakhstan (60,000). Except in Lithuania, 
where 85% of Poles gave Polish as their native language, the Poles are highly as­
similated linguistically; in most republics only 10-15% of the Poles said Polish 
was their native language. Yet since they have assimilated to other Slavic lan­
guages (Byelorussian, Ukrainian, and Russian), loss of Polish as native language, 
or even as second language, would not impose insurmountable barriers to emi­
gration, although it might restrain it to some degree.
Rootedness is another variable. Most Soviet11 Polish communities are old and es­
tablished; but the Poles in Kazakhstan are mostly collectivization-era and wartime 
deportees from western regions. Yet the bearing of rootedness on migration to 
Poland is uncertain. One might think that the Poles of Kazakhstan, being less 
rooted, would be more likely to emigrate. My hunch, however, is that their 
greater isolation from Poland and weaker integration into westerly migratory 
networks will make them less likely to emigrate. In my view, demands for per­
manent resettlement in Poland, of which there are almost none at present, are 
likely to be preceded by a good deal of exploratory temporary labour migration, 
and that Poles in Lithuanian, Byelorussian, or Ukrainian districts immediately 
adjoining Poland will therefore be over-represented among both migrant workers 
and eventual resettlers. On this hypothesis, proximity to Poland and integration 
into networks of information concerning opportunities in Poland would overried 
the migration-inhibiting effect of rootedness.
Ethnic conflict in the successor states may have an independent bearing on Polish 
migration patterns. Conflict between rival ethnonational claims may be strongest 
in Lithuania, given historically antagonistic Polish-Lithuanian relations and the
10 Polish experts in Poland estimate the number of Soviet Poles in the Soviet Union at between 2 
and 4 million-figures far exceeding those of the Soviet census (Gasior 1990, p. 11). The 
figures given in the next paragraph on regional distribution and linguistic Russification are from 
Gasior (1990) and from Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie SSSR (1984).
11 For convenience, I retain "Soviet” as a geographic term. Thus "Soviet Poles" designates Poles 





























































































self-conscious, organized, corporate form of the Polish presence in Lithuania. Yet 
ethnic conflict does not automatically engender increased emigration, even when 
an external homeland is available. Conceivably, by strengthening group cohesion, 
ethnic conflict might work to restrain emigration. Not all modes of conflict are 
migration-engendering. Much depends on the mode of conflict - whether it is 
militarized or otherwise violent, for example, or whether it leads to the enduring 
economic, political, or cultural subordination of one group.
Much depends, finally, on the policy of the Polish state. Two years ago, the 
Mazowiecki government proposed granting Soviet Poles dual Soviet and Polish 
citizenship and facilitating repatriation to Poland (Gasio 1990, p. 15). Yet in the 
context of economic dislocations and increasing Polish concern about non-Polish 
migration from Soviet successor states, it seems unlikely that the Polish govern­
ment will seek in the immediate future to encourage Soviet Poles to migrate. On 
the other hand, it seems equally unlikely that it will turn back those who do ar­
rive, whether to work or to settle.
Research on migration patterns among Soviet Poles could prove fruitful. The fact 
that Poles are scattered in a number of different successor states, both proximate 
to and distant from Poland, and exhibiting greater (Lithuania) and lesser 
(Byelorussia) degrees of ethnonational tension, together with the great range of 
variation in the language, history, organizational forms, boundary mechanisms, 
and economic and social characteristics of the Polish communities make this a 
particularly rich case for comparative study of the complex dynamics of what I 
have rather too summarily called migrations of ethnic affinity in a setting in 
which political, economic, and ethnocultural aspects of the migratory process are 
so closely intertwined.
We can deal much more briefly with the other potential groups of resettlers to 
external homelands. A substantial exodus has already begun among Soviet Greeks 
: 10,000 in 1989, an estimated 20,000 in 1990 (Chesnais 1991b, p. 8). The Finnish 
government is quietly accepting Soviet Finns as immigrants (but not, apparently, 
Soviet Karelians, despite the large number of Karelians in Finland). 
Transcarpathian Hungarians, compactly settled in a single Western Ukrainian dis­
trict adjacent to Hungary, are the most territorially concentrated of the groups we 
are considering. They are also the most nationally "intact" group; 95% of them 
give Hungarian as their native language, while the figures for the other groups 
range from 29% to 68%. The Hungarian government does not encourage their 
in-migration (nor that of the much larger groups of ethnic Hungarians in 




























































































Political Dimensions o f  Migration from  and among Soviet Successor States
has been accepting those who do arrive. I have not yet encountered reports con­
cerning the migration of Soviet Koreans, Bulgarians, or Romanians to their re­
spective homelands, nor concerning the policies of the homeland governments on 
the issue.12
Except for Germans and Jews, and the rather different case of Armenians,12 emi­
grations of ethnic affinity from the Soviet area are only now beginning to de­
velop. Apart from Germany and Israel, no homeland has an explicit "laws of re­
turn" like those of Germany and Israel, publicly guaranteeing immigration and 
citizenship rights. Yet none, as far as I know, has refused entry to its co-ethnics. 
The slow development of these potential migrations is not surprising; it does not 
mean they will not assume much greater amplitude later on. Migration networks 
always take time to develop; after all, when Soviet gates were thrown open in the 
late 1980s for Germans and Jews, these nationalities were able to respond quickly 
in part because preceding, albeit smaller, emigration flows over decades had built 
up extensive migration networks.
In my view, the economic and political dislocations accompanying the breakdown 
of the regime and the breakup of the state will greatly intensify the demand for 
emigrations of ethnic affinity. This will put pressure on other external homelands 
besides Germany and Israel to grant "their" people preferential immigration and 
citizenship status. And it will sharply increase the value, to successor state citizens, 
of what might be called "most favored nationality" status - by which I mean an 
internal nationality (German, Jewish, Greek, etc.) that entitles one to, or at least 
increases the chances of receiving, immigration and citizenship privileges in an 
external homeland.14 This in turn will induce successor state citizens who do not
12 In view of the political and economic conditions in Bulgaria and Romania, the absence of 
movement to these homelands is scarcely surprising. The case of Soviet Koreans is more 
intriguing. The majority of Koreans, deported en masse in the 1930s to Central Asia, do not 
live in the Far East but in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. This dispersion, and attendant linguistic 
Russification, disproportionately affecting younger generations who might otherwise have 
been inclined to emigrate, may have left many Koreans too cut off from Korea for emigration 
to be plausible.
12 Although Armenians do not have an external homeland, their emigration, too, is a migration of 
ethnic affinity, for their large diaspora abroad facilitates their emigration. In 1990, Armenians 
comprised the third largest group of emigrants, after Jews and Germans. The Baltic 
nationalities and Ukrainians also have large diasporas abroad that could support emigration 
networks through family reunification, sponsorship, and so on.
14 The concept of most favored nationality was suggested to me by David Laitin's (1991, p. 143) 





























































































formally have most favored nationality status, yet who have some connection to an 
external homeland, to re-identify with one of the favored nationalities. Given high 
rates of assimilation and intermarriage on the part of most of the Soviet nationali­
ties who have external homelands,!5 the boundaries delimiting these nationalities 
are by no means sharp; and the number of persons with some connection to the 
nationality far exceeds the number officially possessing that nationality in their 
internal passports or officially professing it to a census-taker.16 There is therefore 
considerable room for re-identification with a most favored nationality for pur­
poses of emigration.17 This leads to the paradoxical result that emigrations of 
ethnic affinity, by inducing ethnic re-identification, may increase rather than de­
crease the reservoir of co-ethnics remaining in Soviet successor states.18
Almost all migration is economically conditioned in one way or another, and the 
Soviet emigrations of ethnic affinity are no exception. But whatever the role 
played by economic considerations in prompting individual migrants to leave, we 
should not lose sight of the fact the flows are channelled, activated, indeed made 
possible only by specific immigration and citizenship policies on the part of the 
receiving states. I have characterized these states as external "homelands" of their 
Soviet co-ethnics. But "homeland" is a political, not a cultural category; home­
lands are constructed, not given. A state becomes a "homeland" by deciding to 
recognize (or, in a more aggressive variant, to claim) citizens of another state as
15 See the data presented by the Journal o f Soviet Nationalities 1(2), Summer 1990, pp. 160ff.
16 While the the 1989 census, for example, put the number of Jews in the Soviet Union at 1.45 
million, unofficial estimates run up to four or five times that high. There is of course no 
"correct" figure. The literature on situational ethnicity has amply shown that the salience and 
activation of ethnic identity is heavily context-dependent. When the contexts have changed as 
radically as they have in the Soviet Union and its incipient successor states, the fluctuations in 
ethnic identification should come as no surprise, at least in the case of a loosely bounded 
community with high rates of linguistic assimilation and intermarriage and strong 
inducements-in the case of Soviet Jews, the desire to escape pervasive discrimination-to re­
identify with other groups.
17 Beyond these zones of ambiguous nationality, some seek most favored nationality status 
through outright fraud, or seek marriages of convenience with persons possessing a favored 
nationality. On the increasing demand in Byelorussia for Jewish spouses, and for 
documentation of Jewish roots, see "Byelorussian Jews Sceptical About Their New 
Popularity," The New York Times, November 7, 1991.
18 The potential for this paradoxical development varies inversely with the sharpness of group 
boundaries. In the Soviet Union, Germans have been a more sharply bounded group than 
Jews or Poles. Ethnic Germans in Poland, on the other hand, have been less sharply bounded 
than ethnic Germans in the Soviet Union (who, in turn, have been less sharply bounded than 




























































































Political Dimensions o f  Migration from  and among Soviet Successor States
its own. Becoming a homeland is an act of civic self-definition. To become a 
homeland is to become, virtually if not (yet) actually, the state of and for a group 
that is culturally rather than territorially bounded. It is to recast the criteria of 
membership and belonging, to inflect citizenship in an ethnocultural direction.
It might be argued that nothing could be more natural than for a state to open its 
doors to its co-ethnics. Yet while there may be good and even compelling reasons 
for doing so, it is not always wholly innocent and unproblematic. When a group is 
in urgent need of a home state to provide protection and guarantee basic rights, 
the case is clear. This has been one justification for the Israeli Law of Return; it 
was also the initial justification, although it can scarcely serve as a continuing jus­
tification, for its German analog.19 Nor is an open-door policy for co-ethnics 
problematic when they are the only ones waiting at the gates. But when crowds of 
strangers, many of them in urgent need of refuge, clamor for admission, then 
policies of automatic citizenship for co-ethnics become more difficult to justify. It 
is awkward, for example, for Germany to argue at one and the same time that 
"the boat is full," that it is being overwhelmed by asylum-seekers, and at the same 
time to have admitted well over a million ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe 
and the Soviet Union since 1988 (not including resettlers from the former East 
Germany).
Moreover, to recognize as citizens, or potential citizens, a portion of the citizenry 
of another state can create tensions between the states. It may lead the other state 
to regard that portion of its citizenry as citizens of questionable loyalty, and to 
condemn the homeland state for meddling in its internal affairs. Hungary, with 3 
million co-ethnics in neighboring states, and long suspected by those states of la-
19 Technically, in order to be eligible for immigration and automatic citizenship, the ethnic 
Germans from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union must qualify as Vertriebene, that is, as 
persons "driven out" of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union because of their German 
Volkszugehörigkeit (ethnocultural nationality). But law and administrative practice have 
defined Vertriebene in the broadest possible terms to include virtually all ethnic German 
immigrants from Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, irrespective of the actual circumstances 
of their emigration. What began, then, as a transitional legal provision intended to grant a 
secure legal existence to millions of ethnic Germans who were quite literally Vertriebene, 
driven out of their homes and homelands, became something quite different: an open door to 
immigration and automatic citizenship for ethnic German immigrants from Eastern Europe and 
the Soviet Union. This invitation has been taken up by more than two and a half million 
persons since 1950, half of them in the last few years; at this writing, the influx continues, 





























































































tent territorial revisionism,20 is in a particularly delicate situation. The national- 
populist government has made known its concern for the Hungarian minorities 
abroad, and some officials have claimed that the government regards itself as the 
representative of all Hungarians in the region. But it seems unlikely that the gov­
ernment would formally redefine its citizenry to include, even in potential or 
virtual form, Hungarians in neighboring states. First, increasing unemployment 
makes it reluctant to encourage immigration. Second, while nationalists urge state 
recognition and support of the Hungarians abroad, they do not seek to encourage 
their immigration to Hungary. Rather, they seek to maintain and strengthen the 
Hungarian communities in neighboring states, possibly with a view to future bor­
der revisions. Finally, publicly granting automatic immigration and citizenship 
rights to ethnic Hungarians while moving to adopt at the same time both a gener­
ally restrictive immigration policy and a universalistic procedure for political 
asylum could pose awkward problems for the government. On the other hand, 
public opinion might make it difficult for Hungary (and other potential "home­
lands") to turn away or expel co-ethnics.
What we are likely to see in the near future, in my view, is an ad hoc response to 
the increasing demand for emigrations of ethnic affinity. Without publicly 
declaring themselves to be homelands for their co-ethnics, receiving states will 
nonetheless tacitly grant them preferential immigration and citizenship status.
Besides migrations of ethnic affinity to external homelands, I should note in pass­
ing two further possible types of ethnically conditioned migration across the ex­
ternal borders of the former Soviet Union. I am unaware of any such movements 
currently taking place, but one can imagine circumstances in which they could be 
significant. The first is movement of transborder peoples with no autonomous 
homeland polity in any state, including Gypsies (262,000 in the Soviet Union in 
1989), Uighurs (also 262,000), and Kurds (153,000). The second is movement of 
transborder peoples with Soviet homelands that are now being upgraded to inde­
pendent states. The titular nationalities of most southern-tier ex-Soviet republics 
have substantial numbers of co-ethnics in other states. There are millions of 
Azeris in northern Iran; there are Tadjiks, Turkmen, and Uzbeks in northern 
Afghanistan; and there are Kazakhs and Uzbeks in Sinkiang province of China. 
Cross-border flows in both directions could be significant in these regions, where 
states have long competed to secure the loyalties and shape the identities of their 
transborder peoples (Matuszewski 1985, pp. 87ff).
The Hungarian minority in Danubian Europe dates from the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, which




























































































Political Dimensions o f  Migration from  and among Soviet Successor States
Clearly, it is not emigrations of ethnic affinity that have been causing such anxious 
concern in westward states in the two years. Groups with external ethnic home­
lands comprised only about 2% of the total Soviet population in 1989.21 Their 
migration will be channelled to their respective external homelands. Moreover, 
with the important exception of Jews, the targets of resurgent antisemitism, the 
groups with external homelands are not centrally involved in the ethnonational 
conflicts that are raging in Soviet successor states. Unlike some other Soviet na­
tionalities, they are not likely to have to flee ethnic violence. They can emigrate at 
a more leisurely pace. Their migration patterns will be determined - and can be 
controlled - by their respective ethnic homelands.
Westward concern focuses, rather, on the prospect of massive and uncontrollable 
migrations outside the swelling but manageable streams of ethnic resettlers. It 
centers on the Slavic core populations of the European part of the former Soviet 
Union : Ukrainians, Byelorussians, and Russians. These nationalities, it should be 
emphasized, are scarcely emigrating at all at present, though a certain number are 
working in eastern Poland. It is the potential for large flows, rather than any cur­
rent flows, that worries the states to the west.
In evaluating that potential, I would stress the importance of the "East-East" com­
ponent of westward emigration from Soviet successor states. It is not the well- 
buffered states of Western Europe, but the front-line states of East Central 
Europe, that will absorb the brunt of westward flows. Poland will occupy a spe­
cial position in these flows. Hungary and Czechoslovakia have only short land 
borders with a single province of the Western Ukraine; and Romania, although it 
has a much longer border with Western and Southern Ukraine as well as with its 
incipient sister state of Moldova, is scarcely an inviting destination in its present 
condition of economic and political turmoil. Poland, by contrast, shares a long 
land frontier with Lithuania, Byelorussia, Ukraine, and even Russian Kaliningrad 
oblast. And despite abundant economic hardships of its own, Poland appears to be 
a much more inviting destination than Romania for Soviet Slavic migrants.22 The 
numbers are certainly manageable at present, but Polish officials worry about the 
potential for much larger flows. They and officials of other front-line states are
2 * This figure does not Moldavians, who have an internal homeland as well as the neighboring 
external homeland of Romania.
22 Here I mean Russians, Ukrainians, and Belorussians, not the Soviet Poles discussed above. In 
practice, however, given the high rates of linguistic assimilation on the part of Poles residing in 





























































































understandably concerned about their weak administrative infrastructures in the 
domain of immigration control, and they are seeking to build them up quickly.
In 1990 and 1991, much was made in the West European press about the intro­
duction of a new legal framework governing Soviet travel and emigration - as if 
the enactment of such a measure would suddenly open the floodgates and trigger a 
mass exodus. In fact, the legal framework does not appear to be the key variable. 
In May 1991, the Supreme Soviet approved a law guaranteeing the right to leave, 
but it delayed full implementation of the measure until January 1, 1993. Yet 
throughout the late Gorbachev era, barriers to exit lie less in legal provisions, the 
enforcement of which was intermittent at best, than in the absence of hard cur­
rency; in the great difficulty involved in paying for international travel with 
rubles; and in the absence (for the Slavic groups, with the partial exception of 
Ukrainians) of extensive networks abroad that would facilitate migration.
In Western European countries, buffered by distance and outfitted with well de­
veloped structures of immigration control, concern about Soviet immigration ap­
pears greatly exaggerated. The networks that could facilitate Soviet inflows are 
not (yet) in place;23 and refugee flows that might result from a massive break­
down of public order, to the extent that they spill out of the Soviet area at all, will 
be of much greater and more immediate concern to the front-line states of East 
Central Europe.
Three propositions sum up the discussion so far. (1) Ethnic affinity appears to be 
more important than ethnic conflict in driving emigration to extra-Soviet destina­
tions.24 (2) Refugee flows produced by the politicized ethnic conflict or ethnic 
violence will be concentrated inside the (former) Soviet area. (3) The impact of
23 The provenance of asylum-seekers in Germany vividly illustrates the importance of integration
into migratory networks. In the first half of 1990, more than 10,000 Yugoslavs applied for 
political asylum, compared with 500 Soviet citizens (Chesnais 1991a, p. 14). In proportion to 
population, this meant Yugoslavs were filing at rates more than 200 times their Soviet 
counterparts. By 1990, the primary reason for this was no longer formal barriers to exit. 
Soviet foreign travel had surged to an estimated 3.5 million trips in 1990, a tenfold increase 
over 1986 (Chesnais 1991b, p. 6). Instead, this disparity reflected the gap between Yugoslavs' 
longstanding integration, and Soviets' lack of integration, into Western European migratory 
networks.
24 This is not to say that it is ethnic affinity that drives individuals to emigrate. They may be 
motivated economic or other concerns. My point is that political recognition of the claims of 





























































































Political Dimensions o f  Migration from  and among Soviet Successor States
emigration from the Slavic heartlands will be felt by the front-line states of East 
Central Europe, not by the well-buffered states of Western Europe.
II. Of greater importance, in my view, than the mainly westward emigration 
flows from former Soviet territories are the actual and potential migration flows 
within those territories. Apart from the already large but well-channelled flows to 
Germany and Israel, westward migrations and emigrations will take some time to 
develop. Even if, as seems likely, economic conditions continue to deteriorate, and 
ethnonational antagonisms to intensify, the weakness of networks, the physical 
distance separating most post-Soviet citizens from westward states, the shortage of 
hard currency, and the extremely limited supply of ruble-priced transportation to 
westward states will impede the rapid swelling of westward migratory streams. 
Truly convulsive migrations, occurring even in the absence of developed net­
works, would probably remain "internal."25
"Internal" flows, of course, are not what they once were. The final collapse of the 
Soviet Union and the emergence of incipient successor states-enjoying varying, 
and rapidly changing, degrees of de jure recognition and de facto independence - 
have "internationalized," to varying degrees, what previously counted as "inter­
nal" migration. This has implications not only for the future but also, as it were, 
for the past. It has delegitimized past migrations, transforming yesterday's inter­
nal migrants, secure in their Soviet citizenship, into today's international migrants 
of contested legitimacy and uncertain membership. In so doing it has raised the 
specter of vast migrations of ethnic unmixing, of displacements on a scale unseen 
since the great upheavals of the Second World War and its aftermath.
The ethnodemographic potential for large-scale displacements is considerable. 
Some 65 million ex-Soviet citizens live outside the bounds of their "own" ethnic 
polity. Roughly 10% of these 65 million belong to the groups with external 
homelands that we have already discussed.26 The remaining 90% do not have ex­
ternal homelands; and only a small minority belong to national groups with strong 
ties to large external diasporas (a circumstance that could facilitate emigration). If
25 Even in Yugoslavia, most refugee flows from the civil war have remained "internal," i.e., 
within what used to be Yugoslavia, despite proximity to Western Europe and high degree of 
integration into Western European migratory networks. The forces working to limit the 
westward spillover of refugee flows would be much stronger in the Soviet case.





























































































ethnic unmixing occurs on a large scale, it will occur largely within the territory 
that comprised the Soviet Union.
Two preliminary points should be made about migrations of ethnic unmixing. 
First, ethnic unmixing is not unprecedented in the Soviet setting. Selective migra­
tory unmixing has been occurring in certain Soviet regions for some time. For 
three decades, for example, there has been substantial net migration of Armenians 
from Georgia and Azerbaijan to Armenia, and a modest net migration of Azeris 
from Georgia and Armenia to Azerbaijan. For these nationalities, the refugee 
flows of the last few years, following the outbreak of Armenian-Azeri ethnic vio­
lence in 1988, have only reinforced a long-term trend towards ethnic unmixing in 
Transcaucasia (Silver 1983, p. 377; Anderson and Silver 1989, pp. 638-640). 
More importantly, Russians, too, had begun emigrating from certain peripheral 
regions even before the explosion of nationalist protest in recent years. The cen­
turies-old trend of Russian migratory expansion into non-Russian areas steadily 
has slowed and, in some cases, reversed itself during the last three decades. There 
was a substantial net Russian outflow from Georgia and Azerbaijan during each of 
the last three intercensal periods (1959-70, 1970-79, and 1979-89), and from 
Armenia in the last intercensal period, during which there was also a net outflow 
of Russians, for the first time, from Moldavia, Kazakhstan and each of the Central 
Asian republics. And even though net Russian immigration continued, during the 
last intercensal period, to the Baltics and the Slavic west (Ukraine and 
Byelorussia), the rates of such Russian in-migration have been declining in each of 
these republics except Lithuania.27
Second, not all unmixing is necessarily conflictual. In some cases, it may be posi­
tively desired. The Baltic states, for example, actively seek the repatriation of the 
remnants of their deportee populations from Siberia. And there is no indication 
that the gradual outmigration of Russians from Transcaucasia or Central Asia be­
fore the intensification of national conflict in the late 1980s involved serious 
conflicts or dislocations.
Yet while unmixing is neither new in the Soviet context nor necessarily conflict­
ual, both the vast scale of the potential unmixing in the aftermath of imperial col­
lapse and its connection to intensifying ethnonational conflict distinguish recent 
and prospective migrations in the disintegrating Soviet Union and its successor 
states from earlier instances of ethnic unmixing.
27 Anderson and Silver (1989), pp. 640-642. Anderson and Silver calculate Russians' net 




























































































Political Dimensions o f  Migration from  and among Soviet Successor States
The group most centrally concerned by the potential large-scale unmixing of 
populations is the vast Russian diaspora. That diaspora is the product of four cen­
turies of state-sponsored migration, beginning in the mid sixteenth century, when 
conquest of the Kazan and Astrakhan knanates permitted Russian peasant settle­
ment to expand into the fertile black earth zone heretofore controlled by hostile 
Turkic nomads, and continuing through the postwar decades of the twentieth cen­
tury, when the political reincorporation of the Baltics was followed, in Estonia 
and Latvia, by the massive importation of Russian workers. Throughout these 
four centuries, the eastward, southward, and (more recently) westward dispersion 
of Russians from their initially small region of core settlement has been intimately 
linked to the expansion and consolidation of the Russian state and its Soviet succes­
sor. It has comprised one of the greatest episodes of colonization in human history 
(Raeff 1971; Pipes 19xx, pp. 13-16; Bennigsen and Wibmush 1978).
As a result of this prolonged history of state-sponsored out-migration, some 25 
million ethnic Russians live in non-Russian republics, comprising 18% of their 
total population. There is a substantial Russian presence in every corner of the 
former Soviet union. Only in Armenia is their share of the population less than 
5%. It is 22% in the Ukraine, 30% in Estonia, 34% in Latvia, and 38% in 
Kazakhstan (Anderson and Silver 1989, p. 628). These figures concern only per­
sons identifying themselves as ethnic Russians in the 1989 census. Since 
Ukrainians and Byelorussians, lacking cultural facilities in their own languages, 
have tended to assimilate to Russians when they leave their home republics, the 
Russophone and Russified presence in the peripheral republics is even more 
weighty than these figures suggest.28
Besides the 25 million Russians outside the Russian republic (RSFSR), more than 
10 million Russians live in non-Russian autonomous formations inside the RSFSR. 
Here, the Russian presence is the product of a still longer history of colonization. 
The Russian republic is a microcosm (if the word can be applied to anything so 
vast) of the Soviet Union. It is an enormously complex federal state riven with 
enthnonational tension. Within its borders are 16 "Autonomous Republics" and 15 
lower-level autonomous formations, each formally designated by an ethnonym as 
the polity of and for a particular nationality (or in some cases nationalities). In
28 One caveat should be added here. The growth of national awareness and assertiveness may 
have reversed, or at least arrested, the tendency of non-Russians to assimilate to Russians 
when outside their own republic. This tendency has provoked the ire of Ukrainian nationalists, 
for the Ukraine was "losing” a substantial fraction of its own large diaspora population through 






























































































general, the Russian presence is stronger (in proportion to population) in the au­
tonomous formations in the RSFSR than in the non-Russian republics. In 1979, 
Russians were the largest nationality in 9 of the 16 autonomous republics and an 
absolute majority in 6 of them; they were an absolute majority in 12 of the 15 
lower-level autonomous formations. But even if we leave out of consideration the 
autonomous formations in which Russians form an absolute majority, on the 
grounds that their demographic dominance makes their induced or forced migra­
tion less likely, this still leaves more than 5 million Russians living as minorities 
in autonomous formations.29
If diaspora Russians are especially concerned by the transformation of what was 
previously defined-legally, culturally, and politically - as internal migration into 
what is now defined as international migration, and by the associated challenges to 
their citizenship status, it is not only because they are the largest, and among the 
most mobile, of Soviet nationalities - the Soviet Union's "true nomads," as they 
have been called (Carrère d'Encausse 1978, p. 72). It is also because they have the 
most to lose. Until recently, Russians in the peripheral republics and in the au­
tonomous formations of the RSFSR enjoyed distinct privileges and advantages. 
These included Russian-language schools, newspapers, and other cultural facilities 
and access to desirable jobs throughout the Soviet Union without having to learn 
the local language.3(> They also included less tangible advantages such as the se­
curity of belonging to the Soviet Union's dominant nationality.
As the Soviet Union careened toward disintegration in the last few years, how­
ever, the legal, cultural, political, and psychological position of the Russian dias­
pora changed in fundamental ways. What was formerly an advantage - identifica­
tion with the ruling center and mastery of the statewide "language of interethnic 
communication" - became a liability, as Russians were more openly identified 
with Soviet misrule and oppression, and as the incipient successor states began to 
promote their own languages. Schooling in the local language has been expanded 
at the expense of Russian-language schooling. Knowledge of the local language has 
been proposed as a requirement for employment and citizenship. And relatively 
few Russians know the local languages : figures range from less than 5% in
29 Figures on national composition of autonomous formations in the RSFSR are calculated from
1979 census results, as reported in Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie SSSR (1984), pp.
76-88. 1989 census figures on ethnic Russians in non-Russian autonomous formations in the
RSFSR are not available to me at this writing.
30 This kind of institutionalized cultural support was unavailable for members of other nationalities




























































































Political Dimensions o f  Migration from  and among Soviet Successor States
Central Asia to a high of only 38% in Lithuania (Anderson and Silver 1989, p. 
647). Russian-language street signs have been removed, and local storekeepers and 
officials may pretend not to understand when addressed in Russian. Voting rights, 
in some cases, have been restricted to long-term residents, excluding recent immi- I 
grants, usually Russians. Anti-Russian sentiments have been openly articulated by 
some nationalist groups. Russians have come to face the prospect of losing their 
privileges, their jobs, their right to vote or to own property, their sense of secu­
rity, in some instances even their right to reside in the territory. |
Yet just as the various non-Russian nationalisms differ substantially in their aims, 
methods and programs, so too the response of the Russian diaspora to these pe­
ripheral nationalisms will vary. Emigration from non-Russian territories is only I 
one of an array of possible responses. Other possible responses include individual ,
assimilation, or at least acculturation, to the dominant local population, and col- I
lective mobilization for equal civil rights, for special cultural or linguistic rights, j 
for territorial political autonomy, for secession, or for the restoration of central i 
control.
The extent of Russian out-migration in the aftermath of imperial collapse will 
vary across republics and over time. A first set of factors that will determine its | 
extent includes ethnodemographic variables such as the size, concentration, and j 
rootedness of the Russian populations in the territories in question, as well as the 
trajectory of these variables over time. Where the Russian population is small, I
scattered, or weakly rooted, and especially when it is also rapidly shrinking, the |
prevailing response to local nationalisms is likely to be emigration, together with 
a certain amount of apolitical individual acculturation or assimilation. A large, 
concentrated, and deeply rooted Russian population, on the other hand, is more | 
likely to remain in place and engage in collective political action. Rootedness may i 
be the key variable here. It can be conceived as attachment to the territory in 
which one lives, as expressed in resistance to moving even in the face of induce- I 
ments or pressures to move. Duration of residence obviously contributes to root- j 
edness - not only how long a given individual or family has resided in the terri­
tory, but also how long the community has existed. Ties to the land also contribute I
to rootedness : rural settler populations are ordinarily more deeply rooted than | 
purely urban settlements. Among Russian diaspora communities, rootedness may , 
be greatest in northern and eastern Kazakhstan31 and in the eastern and southern  ̂
Ukraine;32 it is probably weakest in the purely urban settlements of Central Asia. I
„ i
-31 Already in 1911, 40% of the population of an area roughly approximating the northern two- ) 































































































A second set of factors has to do with the character of the non-Russian nationalist 
movements and the terms on which the incipient nation-states accept Russians as 
permanent members of their polities. The crucial variables here are the extent to 
which the local nationalisms are anti-Russian (or become anti-Russian, now that 
there is no longer any point in being anti-Soviet), and the extent to which the 
rewritten rules of the political game in the new nation-states - especially those 
bearing on the language of education, the language of public life, the criteria of 
citizenship, and the rights of permanent residents who are not granted, or do not 
seek, citizenship in the new republics - impose cultural, economic, or political 
costs on the local Russian populations.
A third factor is the texture of everyday life for Russians in the newly national­
ized peripheral republics. Actual or feared violence will stimulate out-migration 
from weakly rooted Russian communities, and it will stimulate demands for 
restoration of central control, or for territorial autonomy, in deeply rooted 
Russian communities. Informal hostility towards Russians, even without the threat 
of violence, may have the same effects. Anti-Russian attitudes and practices are 
likely to be particularly important in Central Asia, given the high degree of seg­
regation between Russians and indigenous nationalities and the more classically 
colonial character of Russian domination there. The great question mark is 
Kazakhstan, where the same segregation and colonial situation exists, yet where 
the Russian settler population is much more deeply rooted, dating from massive 
rural colonization in the late nineteenth century. Russians in Kazakhstan might be 
compared with French settler colonists in Algeria, while Russians in the cities of 
Central Asia might be more aptly compared with urban Europeans in colonies 
without deeply rooted European rural settlements.
A fourth set of factors likely to condition the Russian response to non-Russian na­
tionalisms concerns the possible economic or political advantages,33 balanced 
against cultural and psychological costs, that might induce Russians to remain in a 
successor state despite anti-Russian sentiment and nationalistic language and citi­
zenship legislation. This might be the case in the Baltic states, which have brighter
p. 137). By contrast, only 6% of the population of the remaining parts of Russian Central Asia 
(today's southern Kazakhstan, plus the four Republics of Central Asia proper) were Russians 
(ibid.).
33 In 1897, ethnic Russians comprised 12% of the population of the nine Ukrainian provinces of 
the Russian empire, and a much higher fraction of the population in the industrialized Donets 
region and elsewhere in southern Ukraine (Magocsi 19xx, commentary to Map 18).




























































































Political Dimensions o f  Migration from  and among Soviet Successor States
prospects for economic integration into Europe, and brighter prospects for main­
taining public order and establishing liberal institutions.
A fifth set of factors concerns the orientation and policies of the incipient Russian 
state toward the various communities of diaspora Russians. This includes policies 
toward immigrants and refugees from the peripheral republics in matters of citi­
zenship, immigration, and relocation or integration assistance (housing, employ­
ment, etc.). These policies may differ for different groups of actual or potential 
resettlers; diaspora Russians, in other words, may have differential resettlement 
opportunities. Designated refugees from particular peripheral territories, for ex­
ample, might be granted preferential access to scarce housing.
Besides these "domestic" policies toward immigrants and refugees, we also have to 
consider Russian "foreign policy" initiatives vis-à-vis the peripheral republics, 
seeking either to forestall repatriation to Russia or, if repatriation cannot be fore­
stalled, to regulate it. Russia might seek to prevent a potentially destabilizing 
massive influx of Russians by negotiating, on a reciprocal basis, favorable condi­
tions for the diaspora communities in matters of citizenship and cultural facilities. 
In a harsher mode, it might engage in coercive diplomacy or even intervene with 
military force to reassert central control (albeit Russian, not Soviet) over all or 
part of a refugee - producing peripheral republic, say a hypothetically radically 
nationalist Kazakhstan.34 In general, differential policies of the Russian state to­
ward the various diaspora communities may differentially affect the propensity of 
diaspora Russians to emigrate.
On the basis of these considerations, we can expect sharply differing rates of mi­
gration to Russia on the part of different diaspora groups. Migration may well be 
the dominant Russian response to non-Russian nationalisms in Central Asia 
(excluding Kazakhstan) and Transcaucasia. The Russian population of Central 
Asia, although large, is exclusively urban and not deeply rooted; and it faces 
probably the greatest informal hostility from the indigenous nationalities; the 
Russian population of Transcaucasia is small and rapidly shrinking. Already dur­
ing the 1980s, there was substantial Russian emigration from Central Asia and 
Transcaucasia (Anderson and Silver 1989, p. 641),35 and the rate of emigration 
has increased sharply in the last two years. Russian out-migration rates are likely
34 On coercive diplomacy, see Weiner 1991, p. 56.
33 In the case of Georgia and Azerbaijan, there has been net Russian out-migration in each of the 





























































































to be much lower from areas with territorially concentrated and historically 
rooted Russian populations such as the eastern and southern Ukraine, northern and 
eastern Kazakhstan, Moldavia east of the Dniester, and northeastern Estonia. 
There, we are more likely to see collective political responses on the part of 
Russians to non-Russian nationalisms. Elsewhere in the Baltics, comparatively 
bright medium- and long-term economic prospects, together with concessions to 
the Russian population negotiated by the Russian state, may keep out-migration 
rates down, at least on the part of the more established part of the Russian com­
munities.36
This means that of the twenty-five million Russians in the non-Russian republics, 
only a small fraction - if nonetheless a large group in absolute numbers - is at 
high risk of being induced or forced to flee to Russia in the next few years. The 
Russians most likely to resettle in Russia are those in Central Asia (3.3 million in 
1989) and Transcaucasia (780,000).37 This pool of potential migrants amounts to 
less than 3% of the total population of the RSFSR. In principle, the resettlement in 
Russia of even a substantial fraction of this migrant pool might benefit the RSFSR. 
For decades, Soviet demographers and economic planners have been concerned 
about rural depopulation in central Russia and about labour deficits in areas of the 
RSFSR targeted for development projects. In practice, however, it will be diffi­
cult for the state to steer resettlement in accordance with demographic and eco­
nomic needs. The migration to Russia in the next few years of a substantial frac­
tion of Central Asian and Transcaucasian Russians would place a significant strain 
on the Russian state, which, in the throes of economic crisis, and having no expe­
rience with immigration or refugee flows, is completely unprepared to handle a 
substantial influx of resettlers or refugees.
36 Russian migration to and from the Baltic republics has involved large in-migration and out­
migration flows, with figures reporting net in-migration flows concealing the relatively large 
gross outflows (for the Baltic states generally see Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, p. 206; for 
detailed figures on Latvia see Dreifelds 1991, pp. 52-53; for detailed figures on Estonia see 
JPRS-UPA-90-014, March 22, 1990, p. 61). While established Russians are unlikely to leave 
in large numbers in the near future, the ordinary outflow of short-term migrants will probably 
continue. And since the Baltic states are implementing restrictive immigration policies, future 
inflows of Russians will drop sharply. As a result, the Baltic states would experience modest 
net out-migration of Russians in the next few years even if no Russians were to leave in 
response to the nationalization of life in these states.
37 Since considerable outmigration of Russians has occurred since the census of January 1989, 
the Russian communities are already smaller than indicated by these figures. However, 
substantial fractions of other nonindigeneous nationalities residing in Central Asia may have 
become so assimilated to Russians that, should they leave Central Asia, they might choose to 




























































































Political Dimensions o f Migration from  and among Soviet Successor States
These problems, though, would pale into insignificance by comparison with those 
posed by a massive Russian exodus from the core areas of Russian settlement in 
the non-Russian republics, namely Ukraine and Kazakhstan, home to 11.3 and 6.2 
million Russians, respectively, in 1989, accounting for 70% of the total Russian 
diaspora. With large, territorially concentrated, and historically rooted communi­
ties in these republics, I have suggested, Russians are unlikely to leave in large 
numbers unless (1) government policies and popular practices in Ukraine and 
Kazakhstan take on a much more sharply anti-Russian orientation than they have 
at present and (2) intensifying ethnonational conflict is militarized or otherwise 
linked with actual or threatened violence. Although there is no immediate 
prospect of this occurring, it remains, unfortunately, a real possibility, given the 
tremendous historical suffering of Ukrainians and Kazakhs at the hands of the 
Soviet state, with whose projects Russian settlers - at least in the case of 
Kazakhstan - can be all too easily identified.
Besides the tremendous economic problems it would entail, large-scale resettle­
ment of Russians from Ukraine and Kazakhstan to Russia might well be politically 
destabilizing. Especially if Russians were forced to flee these territories in re­
sponse to sharply anti-Russian state policies or instances or threats of violence, the 
refugees could form core constituencies for radical Russian nationalists committed 
to recovering control of what they could present as "historically Russian" territo­
ries. In other instances, displaced and dispossessed refugees have provided con­
stituencies for extreme nationalist parties and programs.38
Russians, of course, are not the only national group that may experience forced or 
induced migration as a result of the restructuring of the political landscape in the 
wake of the Soviet collapse. I have dwelt on the Russian diaspora because it is by 
far the largest group residing outside its own national territory, and because its 
transformation from dominant state-nationality to beleaguered national minority 
is particularly dramatic. But many other Soviet nationalities may be - and in some 
cases already have been - caught up in politically governed migrations.Escalating 
ethnonational conflict has already produced major refugee flows in Transcaucasia, 
where perhaps half a million Armenians and Azerbaijanis have been forced to 
flee; Meskhetian Turks have fled from ethnic violence in the Fergana Valley of 
Uzbekistan; more recently, in response to the Georgian military crackdown in 
South Ossetia, Ossetians have been fleeing into North Ossetia. Besides such in­
stances of "escape from violence," there are a number of other politically gov-
38 On the role of Hungarian refugees from territories lost after World War I as constituencies for 





























































































erned migration flows. Perhaps the most significant is the migration of more than 
100,000 Crimean Tatars - one of the nationalities deported by Stalin, and never 
formally allowed to return to their homeland - to the Crimea in the last few years, 
where they further complicate the already complicated ethnodemographic land­
scape (the population of the Crimea is 70% Russian, but the has belonged to the 
Ukraine since 1954).
III. The political dimensions of Soviet "internal" migration can be studied both 
prospectively and retrospectively. In this paper, I have adopted a prospective ap­
proach, considering the migrations of ethnic unmixing that may be generated by 
the collapse of the Soviet multinational state and the reconfiguration of political 
authority along national lines. A fuller discussion would include also a retrospec­
tive analysis of the political causes and consequences of earlier migrations of eth­
nic mixing that were generated by the construction and consolidation of the Soviet 
state and its Russian predecessor.
Retrospective and prospective analyses intersect in the present : for the political 
consequences of past migrations of ethnic mixing are among the political causes of 
present and future migrations of ethnic unmixing. Thus, for example, resentment 
of past Russian immigration as a form of colonization or an agency of de­
nationalization may nourish ethnonational exclusiveness or informal hostility that, 
in the increasingly nationalistic political environments of the successor states, may 
increase Russians' propensity to emigrate.
Yet the link is not automatic. The perception of past immigration as a threat to se­
curity or stability will not necessarily engender future emigration to undo that 
threat. The conditions that engender migratory unmixing are distinct from those 
that lead states to experience immigration as a threat to security or stability. This 
is suggested by the experience of Estonia and Latvia. Here, to a greater extent 
than elsewhere in the Soviet Union, massive postwar immigration of Russians en­
gendered deep fears of "national extinction." Latvians' share in the population of 
Latvia was reduced from 77% in 1939 to 52% in 1989, Estonians' share in 
Estonia from over 90% to 61% (Misiunas and Taagepera 1983, p. 272; Anderson 
and Silver 1989, p. 628).39 During the same period, the Russian share rose from
39 in 1945, after the wartime murder of Jews and resettlement of Germans, Latvians' and 
Estonians' shares were larger still; they have been tentatively estimated at 83% and 94% 




























































































Political Dimensions o f  Migration from  and among Soviet Successor States
about a tenth to about a third of the population in both republics. The small size of 
these nationalities (there are fewer than 1.4 million Latvians in Latvia, and fewer 
than a million Estonians in Estonia), together with their highly developed national 
consciousness, made them particularly sensitive about immigration, particularly 
inclined to view it through the prism of potential de-nationalization. In the other 
major regions of Russian migrant settlement - Eastern and Southern Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan, and Kirgizia - national consciousness was much less developed.
By 1989, Latvians were a minority in six of the seven largest cities of Latvia. 
They comprised scarcely more than a third of the population of Riga, which is not 
only the capital, but by far the largest city, accounting for a third of the total 
population; and they comprised a mere 13% of the population of Daugavpils, the 
second-largest city (Dreifelds 1991, pp. 54-55). The weak and declining ethnode- 
mographic trajectory of the titular nationality here and in Estonia gave some 
credibility and resonance to the hyperbolic and irresponsible rhetoric of some in­
tellectuals and politicians - warning of cultural "extinction," "annihilation," even 
"genocide."40
As a result, migration and citizenship issues have been a central and continuous 
pre-occupation of independence movements in these republics (Brubaker, forth­
coming). Autonomous republic-level citizenships have been discussed, proposed, 
and in some cases instituted in other successor states; but nowhere has citizenship 
been the object of as much sustained discussion and heated controversy as in the 
Baltics. Only in Latvia and Estonia does it appear, at this writing, that a substan­
tial fraction of the Russian immigrant population will be excluded from citizen­
ship.
To a greater extent than elsewhere in the Soviet Union, then, Russian immigration 
was regarded in Latvia and Estonia as a threat to the security and stability, 
broadly understood, of the nation and the national polity. National radicals have 
vigorously denounced Russians as colonists and illegal immigrants and demanded 
that citizenship be granted only to those meeting stringent conditions of language,
40 These hyperbolic claims, bellied by the very cultural vigor that supported the remarkably strong 
mass nationalist movements in the Baltics, are found not only on the extremist fringe of the 
political spectrum. In Latvia, for example, the Popular Front has been the mainstream 
nationalist movement, while extremist national radicals have been based in the Citizens' 
Congress, an alternative parliament denying the legitimacy of the Supreme Council and 
claiming to be the legitimate organ of the still-existing Republic of Latvia. Yet the author of a 
1990 paper entitled "The Latvian Nation and the Genocide of Immigration," Maris Plavnieks, 





























































































residence, and loyalty. Yet while recovery of statehood will enable Estonia and 
Latvia to limit further Russian immigration, massive Russian outmigration seems 
unlikely. Although Russians in Estonia and Latvia face resentment, they do not 
fear violence. And while many recent immigrants may leave, most of the more 
settled Russian immigrants will seek to stay, drawn to Estonia and Latvia both by 
the brighter economic prospects of these republics and by a developing sense of 
identification with the polity. Ethnonational conflict is more likely to lead them to 
mobilize to assert collective rights than it is to induce emigration.
The development and dissolution of the great multinational Russian-Soviet state 
offers an extraordinarily rich field for the study of the political determinants and 
consequences of migration. Here I have only addressed a few aspects of a complex 
and multifaceted problem. A comprehensive discussion would begin by analyzing 
the central role played by state-sponsored migration in the formation, expansion, 
and consolidation of the Russian state. This involved two distinct types of popula­
tion flows - the movement of Russians (and other Slavs) into every corner of the 
expanding Russian and Soviet state; and the punitive or preventative deportation 
of groups felt to endanger the security of the state (including, most spectacularly, 
the eight national groups deported in their entirety, mainly from the North 
Caucasus, by Stalin, but also large numbers of persons from the western border­
lands. Both types of flows were decisively (in the second case exclusively) gov­
erned by political causes. And both engendered widely ramifying (and largely 
unintended) political consequences. Intended to consolidate the regime, Soviet-era 
migrations rendered it, in some respects, more vulnerable. Intended to help weld 
Soviet nationalities into a new historical entity, the "Soviet people," they instead 
reinforced ethnic antagonisms and made the ethnodemographic landscape even 
more intractably intermixed than it was before.
If politically governed migrations were central, for four centuries, to the con­
struction and consolidation of the Russian and Soviet states, they will be equally 
central, in the coming years and probably decades, to the dissolution and recon­
figuration of political authority in the wake of the Soviet collapse. The migratory 
dynamics Myron Weiner has identified in post-colonial South Asia may well char­
acterize population flows in post-Soviet Eurasia as well. While international mi­
grations in the developed world have tended to increase ethnic heterogeneity, mi­
grations in post-Soviet Eurasia, as, on balance, in post-colonial South Asia, will 
involve ethnic unmixing. And as in South Asia, the overall tendency will be "to 
more clearly define who is and who is not a citizen in a region of the world where 




























































































Political Dimensions o f  Migration from  and among Soviet Successor States
showed "little or no regard for national boundaries or legal conceptions of citi­
zenship" (Weiner 1991, p. 59).
Post-Soviet Eurasia faces what is likely to be a protracted period of political re­
configuration, involving simultaneously the reconstitution of political authority, 
the redrawing of territorial boundaries, and the "restructuring of populations." 
These multiple reconfigurations are sure to entail considerable migration, possibly 
on a scale unseen since the aftermath of the Second World War. In seeking to un­
derstand the probable dynamics of such flows, we would do well to study migra­
tion patterns in other ethnonationally mixed post-imperial settings. While making 
due allowance for contextual differences, we might well study in comparative per­
spective the links between domestic ethnonational conflict, inter-state relations, 
and migration patterns in the successor states to the Ottoman and Habsburg em­































































































Anderson, Barbara and Brian Silver. "Demographic Sources of the Changing 
Ethnic Composition of the Soviet Union." Population and Development Review 15 
(December 1989):609-656.
Bennigsen, Alexandre and S. Enders Wibmush. "Migration and Political Control: 
Soviet Europeans in Soviet Central Asia.” In Human Migration : Patterns and 
Policies, edited by William H. McNeill and Ruth S. Adams, 173-187. Bloomington 
: Indiana University Press, 1978.
Brubaker, Rogers. "Citizenship Struggles in Soviet Successor States." 
International Migration Review, forthcoming.
Carrère d'Encausse, Hélène. L'empire éclatée. Paris, Flammarion, 1978.
Chesnais, Jean-Claude. 1991b. "The USSR Emigration : Past, Present, and 
Future," OECD, International Conference on Migration, Rome, March 13-15, 
1991 [OCDE/GD(91 )24], p. 6.
Chesnais, Jean-Claude. 1991a. "Migration from Eastern to Western Europe, past 
(1946-1989) and future (1990-2000)." Council of Europe, Conference of 
Ministers on the movement of persons coming from Central and Eastern 
European Countries, Vienna, January 24-25, 1991.
Dreifelds, Juris. "Immigration and Ethnicity in Latvia." Journal of Soviet 
Nationalities 1, no. 4 (Winter 1990-1991 ):43-81.
Gasior, Kristopher. "Poles in the Soviet Union." Report on the USSR 2, no. 52 
(1990): 10-16.
Koch, Fred. The Volga Germans. University Park, PA : Pensylvanian State 
University Press, 1977.
Laitin, David. "The National Uprisings in the Soviet Union," World Politics 44 
(October 1991): 139-177.
Macartney, C.A. Hungary and her Successors : The Treaty of Trianon and its 
Consequences,1919-1937. London : Oxford University Press, 1937.
Magocsi, Paul Robert. Ukraine : A Historical Atlas. Toronto : University of 
Toronto Press, 1985.
Matuszewski, Daniel. "Empire, Nationalities, Borders : Soviet Assets and 
Liabilities." In Soviet Nationalities in Strategic Perspective, edited by S. Enders 
Wimbush, 75-100. London : Croon Helm, 1985.
Misiunas, Romuald and Rein Taagepera. 1983. The Baltic States : Years of 
Dependence 1940-1980'. Berkeley : University of California Press.
Mocsy, Istvan. "Radicalization and Counterrevolution : Magyar Refugees from the 
Successor States and their Role in Hungary, 1918-1921." Ph.D. Dissertation, 




























































































Political Dimensions o f  Migration from  and among Soviet Successor States
Pierce, Richard. Russian Central Asia 1867-1917. Berkeley : University of 
California Press, 1960.
Pipes, Richard. .«'¿a under the Old Regime. New York : Scribner's, 1974.
Raeff, Marc. "Patterns of Russian Imperial Policy Toward the Nationalities." In 
Soviet Nationality Problems, edited by Edward Allworth, 22-42.. New York : 
Columbia University Press, 1971.
Silver, Brian. "Population Redistribution and the Ethnic Balance in 
Transcaucasia." In Transcaucasia : Nationalism and Social Change, edited by 
Ronald Grigor Suny, 373-395. Ann Arbor : Michigan Slavic Publications, 1983. 
Tsentral'noe statisticheskoe upravlenie SSSR (USSR Central Statistical 
Administration). Chislennost' i Sostav Naseleniia SSSR. Moscow, 1984.
Weiner, Myron. "Rejected Peoples and Unwanted Migrants : The Impact of 
Migration on the Politics and Security of South Asia." Conference on the Impact 
of International Migration on the Security and Stability of States, Center for 





























































































The Future Of International 
Migration To Western Europe
Mark J. Miller 
Department of Political Sciences 
and International Relations 
University of Delaware
The future of immigration to Western Europe is far from clear. It is not pre-or­
dained and will be shaped by a multitude of variables, some of which are unfore­
seeable and others of which are in unpredictable realms of human agency. Yet it is 
certain that international migration will greatly affect the future course of 
Western Europe and its foreign relations. 1 That certainty is inscribed in the de­
mographic imbalances between Western Europe and its international environment, 
the wage differentials for agricultural work in places like Vaucluse and Kabylia, 
which are about as great today as they were during the colonial period, and in the 
settlement of millions of immigrants in Europe largely after World War II. 
Arguably, there is no more important issue on the horizon of Europe than the 
immigration question.
In the space of several decades, international migration in Western Europe, in the 
idiom of international relations, has gone from low to high politics. Not too long 
ago, immigration was still largely seen as an adjunct to manpower policy. As 
something that could be increased or decreased in light of labor market needs. It 
generally was not seen as a matter of great import to analysis of Western 
European politics or the foreign relations of Western European states. By 1990, 
however, the asylum-seeker issue and a number of other developments had cata­
pulted immigration concerns to the forefront of domestic and foreign policy 
agendas across Western Europe. Today, much talked about scenarios for the fu­
ture of immigration to Europe range from apocalyptic, Spenglerian-type visions
Paper prepared for the American Political Science Association Convention, August 30, 1991,in 
Washington, D.C.
1 This observation was made by John Rudy at a Foreign Service Institute conference on Europe 




























































































The Future o f  International Migration to Western Europe
of a Europe submerged by uncontrollable waves of international migrants2 to 
equally democratically frightening notions of a Fortress Europa, a Europe of dra­
conian immigration controls and hermetically-sealed borders3. In order to present 
a more plausible assessment of the future of immigration to Western Europe, it 
first seems necessary to explain why the domestic and foreign policy saliency of 
immigration issues increased so dramatically in recent years. This seems impera­
tive because the future of immigration to Europe will be greatly influenced by the 
relatively novel significance attached to immigration issues at the highest levels of 
government. Finally, top policy makers are taking immigration questions seri­
ously and they are coming to appreciate the limitations of unilateral approaches to 
immigration questions as well as the multiple linkages between immigration and 
other foreign and domestic policies. This new understanding is belated, but it is 
extremely significant to the future of immigration to Europe. There may still be 
grounds to expect Western European governments and the European Communities 
to succeed in managing the enormous immigration-related challenges of coming 
decades in a fashion consistent with democratic and humanitarian principles.
Towards the high politics of immigration in Western Europe
The terms high politics and low politics gained prominence in scholarly debates of 
the 1970s when students of international relations differed on fundamental as­
sumptions about their field of inquiry. Proponents of high politics were tradi­
tional realists who assumed that the key analytical questions of the field pertained 
to peace and war between nation-states. Sovereign states and their policies, par­
ticularly their foreign and national security policies, were seen as the appropriate 
focus of students of international relations. Proponents of low politics, on the 
other hand, assumed that transnational actors like multinational companies also 
could greatly influence world politics like sovereign states and they attached 
greater significance to social and economic processes linking various societies. 
While the lines of demarcation between proponents of high politics and low poli­
tics were never incontrovertible, it seems obvious that international migration was 
a matter of low politics. International migration clearly was a transnational phe-
2 A movie has popularized the idea of possible mass migration to Europe from the South. In 
L'Europe submergée, the late Alfred Sauvy contrasted the demographic decline of Western 
Europe with the demographic explosion in the Third World. See A. Savvy, L'Europe 
Submergée, (Paris: Dunod, 1987).
3 The Fortress Europa notion originated in debate over international economic policies. It then 





























































































nomenon in that it affected at least two societies and it was assumed not to affect 
the questions of high politics.
This perhaps overly schematic characterization of how international migration 
was apprehended by differing schools of analysis should not obfuscate an impor­
tant point. The transformation of immigration issues from low to high politics did 
not occur overnight. A long learning process was involved. And international mi­
gration was always a matter of some significance to understanding the domestic 
and foreign politics of most Western European states. Its significance, however, 
was generally mis- or under appreciated. The history of the international relations 
of international migration in the Western European context is not widely known. 
Yet one can make a plausible case that an international regime pertaining to inter­
national migrants to Western Europe has long existed. Foreign labor issues have 
long been important concerns in the bilateral relations of many Western European 
states4. There was a confluence of five principal factors, some long term others 
occurring only in the late 1980s, that largely explain the higher profile, indeed 
urgency, attached to immigration-related policy by 1990. It is difficult to rank 
order these factors in terms of their significance.
The most obvious was the dramatic increase in asylum applications in the 1980s. 
By 1990, virtually all Western European states had revised their asylum policies 
with a view toward discouraging "frivolous" applications by presumed economi­
cally motivated migrants and had considerably increased resources allocated to 
asylum adjudication5. Despite these measures, asylum applications continued to 
rise as did asylum-related expenditures to the point that several key European 
states, most notably Germany and Switzerland, began to balk at their treaty 
commitments. The erosion of public support for asylum policies in Western 
Europe threatened maintenance of the international refugee regime elsewhere and 
prompted the multilateral cooperation and coordination that led to the EC's 
Dublin Agreement with regard to asylum applications adjudication in June of 
1990.
The political transformation of Central and Eastern Europe and the removal of 
many physical and legal barriers to emigration also accounts for the new salience
4 See Mark J. Miller, "Evolution of policy modes for regulating different types of population 
movements among countries", in Mary Kritz et al. eds., Global interactions: International 
migration systems in an interdependent world, (London: Oxford University Press, 
forthcoming).




























































































The Future o f  International Migration to Western Europe
of immigration issues in Western Europe. Euphoria over the collapse of the wall 
was quickly followed by panic over the specter of mass migration from states 
formerly dominated by communist parties, As understanding of the economic di­
vide separating Europeans grew as did appreciation for the potential for ethnic 
violence and refugee-generating political instability, greater emphasis was placed 
on the need to formulate Western European policies that would abate or channel 
immigration. Immigration abatement became a key concern in Western European 
thinking about its relationship to those societies long dominated by communist 
parties.
The movement towards creation of a Single European Market also helped propel 
immigration issues and concerns to the top of foreign policy agendas. 
Immigration, of course, lies outside the ambit of the Treaty of Rome. And the le­
gal status of resident aliens from non-EC states in EC member states is not di­
rectly affected by the Single European Act. However, some have argued that it 
would be incongruous to exclude legally resident aliens from non-EC states from 
the freer mobility within the EC6. Moreover, plans to remove frontier barriers to 
the movement of goods, workers, services, and capital within the European 
Communities will make it more difficult to stymie unauthorized alien entry at in­
ternal frontiers. And the prospect for enhanced freedom of movement has en­
couraged a tendency for greater coordination and cooperation in immigration-re­
lated matters between EC member states. Immigration concerns have also figured 
prominently in negotiations between the EC and the large number of states seek­
ing entry into the EC. Swiss negotiations with Brussels, for example, have in­
volved extensive exchange of views about Swiss seasonal labor policy.
A fourth factor pushing immigration issues into the limelight has been a growing 
appreciation of the seriousness of integration questions facing European states 
with substantial foreign-born and resident alien populations. Relatively little 
thought was given to integration during the halcyon years of foreign worker re­
cruitment. But since the recruitment curbs, major efforts have been made to pro­
mote immigrant integration. On the whole, an assessment of these post-1970 inte­
gration policies would be mixed as the results have been insufficient in may re­
spects. A syndrome of housing problems, educational barriers, discrimination, 
and high unemployment continues to affect many immigrant communities7.
6 W.R. Boehning and J. Werquin, Some Economic, Social and Human Rights Considerations 
concerning the Future Status o f Third-Country Nationals in the Single European Market, 
(Geneva: ILO-WEP Working Paper, 1990).
7 Rogers Zegers de Beijl, Discrimination o f Migrant Workers in Western Europe, (Geneva: ILO- 





























































































Festering resentments occasionally explode into protests. Meanwhile, in several 
Western European countries, anti-immigrant political parties have gained 
strength. Domestic political measures are such that Western European leaders and 
statesmen can no longer ignore the ramifications of external developments for 
immigration. French policy towards Algeria, for example, is inextricably bound 
up with multiple immigration policy concerns ranging from the dreaded scenario 
of a Muslim fundamentalist regime in Algeria that would spark massive emigra­
tion to France8 to possible effects of French foreign polities vis a vis the Iraq- 
Kuwait Crisis upon volatile relations between North Africans and the majority 
population in France9. In Western European states with significant Muslim immi­
grant minorities, integration issues appear more complex than elsewhere.
Fifthly, Western European states have increasingly turned to diplomacy to grope 
for solutions to immigration dilemmas because of their growing appreciation of 
the limited capacity of democratic states to regulate international migration. 
Border enforcement, employer sanctions, legalizations and temporary foreign 
worker policies are characteristic strategies to reduce or prevent illegal alien en­
try, employment and residency. Since roughly 1970, most Western European 
states have developed a substantial legal and administrative capacity to curb illegal 
immigration. These strategies have tangible results and benefits, but they are in­
sufficient in and of themselves. They must be complemented with foreign policy 
initiatives which hold out a prospect for immigration abatement through devel­
opment and improvement of the quality of life in the areas of massive emigration, 
between 1985 and 1990, a certain optimism that internal control measures could 
stem the tide of illegal immigration was replaced by growing pessimism as to the 
efficacy of that control strategy in light of palpably surging illegal immigration.
In the literature on international relations, phenomena generally could be pegged 
as either falling into the realm of high politics or low politics. The case of inter­
national migration to Western Europe suggests that the phenomenon that once was 
generally understood as a matter of low politics can undergo a transformation 
and, evolve or accede, as it were, into the realm of high politics. The observation, 
for example, that Western European immigration policies have significant na­
tional security policy implications seems self-evident today whereas a relatively
° See, François Soudan, "Mitterand contre les islamistes”, Jeune Afrique, Number 1594, July 
17-24, 1991, pp. 16-20.
9 See, "Les répercussions de la guerre du golfe sur les arabes et les juifs de France”, Migrations 




























































































The Future o f  International Migration to Western Europe
short time ago such an assertion would have been regarded by many as preposter­
ous.
Both objectively and subjectively, then, the question of international migration to 
Western Europe has changed considerably since say 1970. Objectively, the 
durable presence of millions of immigrants has altered the landscape of Western 
European societies and politics making immigration policy a far more complex, 
important and difficult question than it once was. Many of the trends and situa­
tions that give rise to international migration, which often were discernible back 
in 1970, have since evolved. The gap in living standards and perceptions of qual­
ity of life between Western Europe and much of its international environment has 
grown as have demographic imbalances. Meanwhile, the political situation in 
much of the Third World has worsened while international migration has become 
a steadily more available option due to improvements in international communi­
cation and transportation. Most importantly, the thick web of transnational hu­
man, economic and political relations which already by 1970 had made interna­
tional migration partially autonomous from (or impervious to) governmental 
regulation has progressed. Transnational family, village, and regional networks 
are more extensive and developed in the 1990s than they were in 1970.
Subjectively, Western European understanding of international migration has un­
dergone a revolution of sorts. Libraries overflowing with books and theses on 
immigration bear witness to the progress made in s c h o l a r s h i p 111. Strategies of de­
politicization of immigration issues such as once analyzed by Gary Freeman are 
no longer v i a b l e 1 ! .  Political parties now have immigration experts and stands on 
immigration issues help or hurt candidates at the polls. Catherine Wihtol de 
Wenden has identified the mid-1970s as a watershed period in French politics in 
that once marginal immigration issues became central concerns for French politi­
cians at about that time12. The era of the high politics of immigration should have 
begun in the later 1960s or early 1970s. But it took several additional decades for 
Western European governments to begin to give international migration the top 
priority attention it long deserved.
111 See, Peter O'Brien, The Paradoxical Paradigm: Turkish Migrants and German Policies, 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin dissertation, 1988), pp. 108-109.
11 Gary P. Freeman, Immigrant Labor and Racial Conflict in Industrial Societies, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1979).
12 Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, Les immigres et la politique, (Paris: Presses de la Fondation 





























































































Can the high politics of immigration enable Europe to cope with in­
ternational migration in coming decades?
The growing saliency of immigration-related issues can be attributed, in part, to 
the inadequacy of past policies. But what will be the shape of policies to come and 
do they stand a realistic change of regulating international migration? Analysis of 
recent manifestations of the high politics of Western European immigration pro­
vides some clues as to the future of immigration to Western Europe. This evi­
dence does not square well with either the Fortress Europa notion or the 
Spenglerian-like vision of a Europe overrun by migrants. Instead, it would appear 
more reasonable to expect a comprehensive and long-term effort to bring inter­
national migration under an acceptable level of governmental control through a 
combination of foreign policy initiatives and reinforced domestic policies. There 
will be a great deal of continuity in Western European immigration policies of the 
future in addition to changes that hold out a reasonable long-term prospect for 
achievement of a politically acceptable measure of immigration control.
Integration policy will remain the bedrock of Western European immigration 
policies of the future. Severe integration problems are the principal legacy of the 
guestworker recruitment era. The severity of the integration problems facing 
many, but certainly not all, legally-resident aliens means that Western European 
governments and the EC will face several more decades of growing expenditures 
and public and private efforts to integrate legally-resident aliens.
The Fortress Europa scenario is fundamentally flawed because it does not recog­
nize the irreversible results of the past two decades of integration policies. Groups 
like the National Front seek to compress or undo the legal rights gained by immi­
grants. It is virtually inconceivable that the status of legally-admitted aliens could 
be changed in a retrograde fashion, hence, it doesn't make much sense to speak of 
a Fortress Europa of draconian policies towards aliens. Legally-admitted aliens 
will continue to benefit from a full panoply of rights, including the right of fam­
ily reunification, and further improvements seem reasonable to expect as Western 
European governments will seek to reinforce not undo integration policies13. 
Family reunification rights mean that Western Europe's borders will be no more 
hermetically-sealed in the future than they were following the recruitment curbs. 
The notion of closing the borders has not only been nonsensical for politicians and 
analysts to bandy about, it is illegal and contrary to human rights.
13 This observation is based on a recent study and subsequent report by a team of experts 




























































































The Future o f  International Migration to Western Europe
A key question to be resolved involves the status of resident aliens from non-EC 
countries in the Single European Market. On the one hand, the elimination of re­
maining barriers to free movement of labor, etc., could become a powerful addi­
tional incentive to naturalization. All legally resident aliens from non-EC coun­
tries within the EC theoretically can benefit from the reform through acquisition 
of citizenship in a member state of the EC. Ease of naturalization, of course, 
varies significantly from one EC member state to the next14. Greater harmoniza­
tion of naturalization and citizenship laws with a view toward reducing barriers to 
the acquisition of citizenship would be one way to enhance integration, although 
naturalization or possession of citizenship alone does not guarantee integration. 
The plight of Black Britons provides ample evidence that citizenship possession 
does not preclude significant integration problems.
There is concern, of course, that maintenance of the status quo with regard to 
resident aliens from non-EC countries will only deepen alienation and widen the 
integration gap that so desperately needs to be closed. Thus a political initiative 
that would respond to many of the concerns raised in an important recent paper 
by W.R. Boehning and J. Werquin cannot be ruled out15. On the other hand, po­
litical passions surrounding immigration issues in several EC member states are 
such that chances for a measure greatly improving say the access of legally resi­
dent Turks in Germany to employment in France appear remote.
The primacy of integration concerns in Western European immigration policies 
of the future has as a corollary the virtual impossibility of massive recourse to 
foreign worker recruitment on a scale similar to that of the 1960s. Western 
European governments will have a difficult enough time employing poorly edu­
cated second and third generation immigrants and other poorly educated or low- 
skilled workers. The first responsibility of Western European governments will 
continue to be towards their citizens and resident aliens. Their second order of re­
sponsibility will be toward citizens and perhaps resident aliens of fellow EC 
member states. Only when labor market needs arise that cannot be met by national 
and European labor markets could legitimate consideration be given to recruit­
ment of foreign labor. And there will always be political controversy as there 
virtually is never consensus that foreign workers need to be recruited.
14 See, generally, William Rogers Brubaker, ed., Immigration and the Politics o f Citizenship in
Europe and North America, (Lantham, MD: University Press of America, 1989), especially pp.
99-128.





























































































There nevertheless is some potential for limited recruitment of foreign labor in 
the Western European future. One German study of future EC labor market needs 
foresaw a large shortfall of workers, on the order of five million jobs that could 
not be filled by projected internal supply16. Labor shortages were seen as likely to 
develop unevenly with some member states, particularly France, seen as continu­
ing to face prolonged high rates of unemployment. Generally speaking, 
implementation of the Single European Market will promote economic growth 
and create jobs. Most of the jobs created will require skilled or highly skilled 
labor. Implementation of the Single European Market is not expected to give rise 
to a great deal of inter-EC member-state mobility by low-skilled workers. Rather 
highly-skilled and professional level workers are expected to be the principal ben­
eficiaries of the elimination of remaining barriers to freedom of movement.
The likelihood of an excess supply of low-skilled workers in some EC member- 
states combined with the evolution of the Western European labor market to the 
benefit of employment prospects for professional-level employees makes resump­
tion of massive legal recruitment of unskilled or poorly qualified manual workers 
unlikely. Western European states will continue to welcome highly skilled and 
professional level workers as they have in the past. These immigrants, in 
Boehning's terms, are "highly invisible" and do not pose an integration prob­
lem.17.
Several Western European states have, however, evidenced a willingness to re­
open labor recruitment "windows" in the context of bilateral and multilateral 
diplomacy. France and Germany, in particular, have signed a number of bilateral 
labor agreements with Central and Eastern European states, specifically Poland, 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary. These agreements include provisions for recruit­
ment of trainees, contract workers and other employees whose residency rights, 
and other rights, are quite limited due to the temporary and conditional nature of 
their employment in the EC member-state18. In many respects, signature of these 
agreements came as a surprise in that they would appear to risk re-inventing the
16 Heinz Werner related the conclusions of this study at the Center for Migration Studies Legal 
Conference in March of 1991.
17 W.R. Boehning, "International Migration to Western Europe: What to Do?", Geneva: paper 
presented at the Graduate Institute of Intemadonal Studies, July 1991.




























































































The Future o f  International Migration to Western Europe
guestworker wheel. But overriding foreign policy considerations prevailed and 
the recruitment windows were opened as experiments.19.
Thus a new period of labor recruitment has begun. Most of the Central and 
Eastern Europeans have been or will be recruited as contract workers, frontier 
workers or as trainees. In addition, visa restrictions have been lifted for citizens 
of several former-Warsaw Pact states. The 1991 agreement between the 
Schengen-group EC member states and Poland abolished visa obligations for Poles 
wishing to travel to the Schengen area. The quid pro quo, however, was that 
Poland agreed to cooperate and accept back its nationals who violated the terms of 
their entry to the Schengen area by overstaying visas and working illegally. 
Poland also agreed to take back third country nationals who transit to the 
Schengen area and subsequently violate immigration rules. Thus the bilateral 
agreements to permit limited labor recruitment were tied to immigration control 
efforts and to broader foreign policy initiatives towards selected states undergoing 
the transition from socialist to capitalist economies and from communist rule to 
Westem-style democracy.
The scenario of mass migration from Central and Eastern Europe is taken very 
seriously in Western Europe. After all, about two million persons emigrated from 
the former Eastern bloc area in 1990. Most of these individuals, however, were 
ethnic minorities - Jews going to Israel, Greeks to Greece or Germans to 
Germany. This ethnic migration is quite different from the unwanted and uncon­
trollable migration sometimes conjured up. And, it is finite. There are several 
reasons why Western Europe is unlikely to be submerged by hordes of migrants 
from the East.
First, the demography of several Central and Eastern European states is not dis­
similar from that of Western European societies. It is above all the Soviet Union 
and Romania that would appear to be capable of producing large numbers of emi­
grants. Moreover, Romanian and Soviet emigrants would have to transit states like 
Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The Western European states will endeavor 
to create a kind of immigration-related cordon sanitaire as states like Poland, 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia have a vital interest in immigration control. They 
would be the most adversely affected say by the breakdown of political order in 
the USSR.






























































































Second, illegal immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe do not generally 
possess the family and village networks which enable many aliens say from 
Turkey or North Africa to evade immigration controls and find employment20. 
There are substantial populations of Central and Eastern European descent in a 
number of Western European states21 but, except for the substantial refugee 
populations of recent decades, these populations generally have had little contact 
with homelands since the interwar period. The presumed paucity of networks 
available to Eastern Europeans will limit their ability to emigrate.
Western European states are attempting to foster political stability and economic 
development in Central and Eastern Europe through a variety of policies. Only 
time will tell whether these policies can help bring about conditions which would 
help keep Eastern Europeans at home. Signature of the European Convention on 
Security and Cooperation is supposed to create a mechanism ensuring respect for 
human rights and, as complemented by economic development, maintenance of at 
least minimal living standards throughout Europe. This mechanism eventually 
should reduce asylum-seeker flows from Central and Eastern Europe and render 
abjudication of claims by persons originating from that area unproblematical. 
There will be no legal grounds for asylum if ECSC ensures respect for human 
rights.
There is also some prospect for trade and investment policy initiatives by Western 
European states and the EC towards Eastern Europe which might reduce migra­
tory pressures. The chances of states like Hungary or Czechoslovakia acceding to 
full membership in the EC appear extremely remote over the short to medium 
term. However, some intermediary steps, including elements of a free trade-like 
approach, cannot be ruled out. The fundamental problems blocking Eastern and 
Central European entry into the EC are concern over the cohesiveness of the EC 
and the huge gap between Western and Eastern European economies. In the best 
scenario, it would take twenty years for the most advanced Central and Eastern 
European economies to reach levels comparable to those of Spain and Portugal 
today. Trade and investment policies historically have been difficult to manipulate 
for emigration abatement purposes22. That leaves foreign economic assistance tied 
to emigration-abatement goals as a strategy. There may be some potential for
20 Address by Georges Tapinos to the Salzburg Seminar, April 1991.
21 1991 Sopemi Report, (Paris: OECD, 1991), pp. 9-10.




























































































The Future o f  International Migration to Western Europe
genuine abatement in such a strategy, but there is little or no empirical evidence 
of such results23. Foreign economic assistance like the labor recruitment windows 
will be linked to cooperation between states in regulating international migration. 
Western European states undoubtedly will attempt to foster international coopera­
tion in immigration matters through the carrot of economic assistance.
A great unknown in the future of international migration to Western Europe con­
cerns the relationship between migration from Central and Eastern Europe and 
that from the traditional emigration zones of the Mediterranean littoral. Already 
French farmers in the Vaucluse are looking to Poland for workers to replace a 
dwindling supply of Spaniards. Emigrating from Central and Eastern Europe is 
sometimes portrayed as preferable to North African immigration because of the 
enormous political tensions endemic to North African immigration. Similarly, 
there is some fear in Turkish communities in Western Europe that they will be 
economically displaced or otherwise adversely affected by the new emigration 
from the East. Such fears probably are misplaced as they seem to presume either 
that Western European governments will purposively seek to substitute new mi­
grants for the established ones or that Western European states are incapable of 
regulating international migration. Neither assumption would appear warranted. 
While Western European states possess only a limited capacity to regulate inter­
national migration, that capacity is ample, consequential and demonstrable. There 
is every reason to believe that Western European governments will devote more 
resources and energy to domestic-side immigration control measures than in the 
past.
Before turning to the second pillar of future immigration policies - domestic 
control policies - more should be said about the high politics of trans- 
Mediterranean immigration. As in the case of Central and Eastern Europe, diplo­
matic initiatives aimed at promoting economic development and political stability, 
in part out of concern over the migratory potential of North Africa, are likely. 
They also will probably include a mixture of trade, investment and economic as­
sistance policies. There also may be limited foreign worker recruitment primarily 
for agriculture, construction, hotels and restaurants or households. But such re­
cruitment would be so politically controversial that it almost certainly would be 
very limited, if permitted at all. It is illusory to regard massive foreign labor re­
cruitment as a solution either to Western Europe's demographic graying, to the 
demographic imbalance between Western Europe and the Third World or to the
23 See Joint ILO-UNHCR Meeting on International Aid as a Means to Reduce the Need for 





























































































massive unemployment in North Africa that most likely will expand rather than 
contract in coming decades.
Immigration has long been a key concern in France's relations with the 
Maghreb24. Italy, Spain and France have been encouraging Euro-Maghrebi dia­
logue on a broad spectrum of issues. The perceived growth in the appeal of 
Islamic fundamentalism in North Africa, as evidenced in the 1990 Algerian elec­
tions, has lent an air of urgency to this dialogue. Already in 1990 there was some 
evidence of middle-class Algerians moving to France out of fear of life under a 
fundamentalist regime25. The French in particular view maintenance of non-fun­
damentalist regimes as a vital interest and this dictates a maximum of attention and 
resource allocation to measures that will foster socio-economic development and 
political stability in North Africa. Emigration from North Africa is sometimes 
portrayed as functioning as a political safety valve. Emigration doubtlessly has 
relieved un- and underemployment as well as provided exit to political dissent. 
Remittances from overseas emigrants play a vital economic function in North 
Africa26. At the same time, emigration has long permitted political opposition to 
operate much more freely across the Mediterranean than at home. Like Turkish 
authorities alarmed by manifestations of Turkish Islamic fundamentalism in 
Western Europe, North African governments have long had to contend with polit­
ical opposition manifested above all in emigrant communities in Western Europe. 
It is not self-evident that emigration has a politically stabilizing effect on the polit­
ical systems of countries of emigration over the long run.
There doubtlessly will be advocacy of resuming labor recruitment from North 
Africa for a host of labor market, demographic and strategic or national security 
reasons. But there will be intense political opposition to such advocacy and there 
is little evidence that foreign labor recruitment policies can realize the goals for 
which they are advocated. The prudent middle course between resumption of 
large-scale foreign labor recruitment and policies that would undermine regimes 
in North Africa is maintenance and further development of integration policies.
24 See, for example, Mark J. Miller, "Reluctant Partnership: Foreign Workers in Franco-Algerian 
Relations, 1962-1979", Journal o f International Affairs 33:2, 1979, pp. 219-237.
25 Interviews with IREMAM immigration specialists in Aix-en-Provence, May, 1990.
26 Gildas Simon, "Les transferts de revenus des travailleurs maghébins vers leur pays d'origine" 
in G. Simon, Ed., Les effets des migrations internationales sur les pays d'origine: les cas du 




























































































The Future o f  International Migration to Western Europe
Such policies provide for family reunification and may work against the appeal of 
Islamic fundamentalism over the long run. Leveau and Kepel have demonstrated 
the diversity of Islam in France27. Kepel's thesis that the settlement of immigrants 
by the mid-1070s was the precondition to a re-affirmation of Islam amongst 
France's three million or so immigrants of Islamic background probably can be 
safely extended to Western Europe’s six million immigrants of Islamic back­
ground28. Islamic affirmation obviously does not necessarily involve adhesion to 
Islamic fundamentalism, itself a very diverse phenomenon. There is reason to be­
lieve that integration problems enhance the appeal of Islamic fundamentalism 
amongst some Western European Moslems. But most Muslims in Western Europe 
do not appear to identify with Islamic fundamentalism. Successful integration 
policy can be expected to dampen the appeal of anti-Western Islamic fundamental­
ism in Western Europe and the homelands. Draconian policies aimed against 
legally resident immigrants would be politically counterproductive both in 
Western Europe and North Africa.
The second pillar of future immigration policies in Western Europe will continue 
to be a panoply of internal or domestic policy measures aimed at preventing ille­
gal immigration, residency and employment. Such measures include enforcement 
of employer sanctions and border controls as well as legalization, control of ille­
gal immigration became an important concern for most Western European gov­
ernments in the early 1970s. However, the results of internal control measures are 
difficult to measure and evaluate. Somewhat paradoxically, measures like en­
forcement of employer sanctions are regarded as both necessary and insufficient.
As previously indicated, the perception that measures like employer sanctions en- j 
forcement and legalization were insufficient have contributed to the high politics 
of immigration, but that does not mean that Western European governments will 
abandon such policies in favor of an alternative approach to prevention of illegal 1 
migration.
The evolution of employer sanctions enforcement, legalization policy and other 
dimensions of the Western European quest for immigration control have been 
analyzed at great length elsewhere29. In brief, legalization policies have only been
27 Rémy Leveau and Gilles Kepel, eds., Les musulmans dans la société française, (Paris: Presses | 
de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1988).
28 Gilles Kepel, Les Banlieues de l'Islam (Paris: Seuil, 1987).
29 A book-length manuscript entitled Quest fo r Control co-authored by Phil Martin and partially | 





























































































partially successful in that residual illegal immigrant populations remain and there 
is considerable evidence that the policies serve to attract additional illegal immi­
grants hoping to qualify for legalization or who replace the legalized aliens in the 
labor force. Legalization policies are difficult to implement and have been 
plagued by counterfeit documents and other forms of criminality. Legalization 
policies, however, have had limited beneficial results as they have legalized the 
status of tens of thousands of illegal aliens who once faced the discriminations in­
herent in illegal status. Despite its many drawbacks, there often appears to be no 
alternative to legalization as a humane solution to irregular alien status.
Enforcement of employer sanctions also has faced many hurdles. Most Western 
European states have laws punishing illegal employment of aliens and have re­
vised these laws and reinforced enforcement of the laws since 1970. While it is 
impossible to measure illegal alien employment in Western Europe, the phe­
nomenon has progressed rather than regressed since 1970. However, it would 
probably be far more pervasive in the absence of laws prohibiting and punishing 
it. Enforcement of employer sanctions has had a limited deterrent effect in 
Western Europe. And it is important to stress that Western European states pos­
sess a far greater capacity to punish illegal alien employment in the 1990s as 
compared to 1970. Incremental efforts to refine employer sanctions enforcement 
will continue in the future. There is some chance that the question of an EC di­
rective concerning illegal immigration will be revisited as the French govern­
ment has unofficially requested reopening the question closed by mainly British 
objections to employer sanctions313. Interestingly, the British now consider their 
laws punishing harborers of illegal migrants as an employer sanction although 
that legal provision has only rarely been used to punish employers in the past3!.
Plus $a change, plus c'est la meme chose?
Integration of resident aliens and control of illegal immigration have been objec­
tives of many Western European states since the mid-1970s. What genuinely is 
new is the priority attached to these objectives in the 1990s and the redefinition of 
immigration as a foreign policy and domestic policy concern. There is a long, if 
insufficiently known, history of international, multilateral and bilateral coopera­
tion and conflict over international migration issues involving Western Europe.
Based on a 1991 interview with a high-ranking EC official who requested anonymity.





























































































The Future o f  International Migration to Western Europe
The high politics of immigration in the 1990s will be conditioned by that long 
history. Hence, the likelihood of a great deal of continuity in Western European 
immigration policies of the future. One hesitates to use policies instead of Western 
European immigration policy, because there will have to be closer immigration 
policy coordination (if not harmonization) in the future than in the past. The 
Single European Market renders such coordination and cooperation imperative 
despite the quite dissimilar immigration histories of many Western European 
states.
Western European states will continue to receive significant numbers of illegal 
immigrants over the foreseeable future, but the governmental capacities to curb 
illegal migration and employment developed since 1970 should be able to keep the 
phenomenon within politically acceptable bounds if there is tangible progress to­
wards a truly comprehensive approach to immigration control. Western 
Europeans have never seen employer sanctions, frontier controls or legalizations 
as one-shot panaceas. There has long been an awareness that immigration was a 
complex question connected to global issues. Now that awareness is being increas­
ingly manifested in the bilateral and multilateral relations of Western European 
states a development that augers well for a comprehensive approach to immigra­
tion policy. It is the reconceptualization of trade, investment and foreign policies 
in terms of their likely effects upon international migration that provides some 
grounds for optimism that Western Europeans will cope with the formidable 
challenges certain to be posed by international migration in coming years.
The future of immigration to Western Europe, however, is cloudy at best. Many 
top Western European immigration policy administrators are deeply pessimistic 
about the future of immigration. They fear that international developments and 
policy changes since the mid-1980s have eroded the progress made toward immi­
gration control over the 1975 to 1985 period. The vision of a Europe submerged 
by uncontrollable waves of international migrants is the extreme expression of 
such pessimism whereas the vision of a Fortress Europa is its extreme antidote. 
Paradoxically, the former vision appears to underestimate the capacity of demo­
cratic states to regulate international migration whereas the former exaggerates 
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